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ABSTRACT
The early 1990s’ foreign missionary flood into St. Petersburg, Russia led to a seemingly
large spiritual harvest. However, over the years as the reported spiritual fruit substantially
decreased, it was soon discovered that this harvest was actually an illusion. Research has shown
that overall worldview was not implemented into missionary efforts like it should have been.
Statistics reveal a declining trend in true believers in Russia, and as a new generation of Russians
are rising up, so are the number of atheists in St. Petersburg. In searching for a solution to
reverse this trend and more effectively reach Russians by seeing true, worldview-changing
conversions to Christianity take place, the author used questionnaires and interviews and
compared the results with scholarly sources to determine that a major worldview shift has taken
place among those born after 1980.
Soviet Russians, born 1980 and earlier, are one of the two generations the author
discovered in the scope of implementing worldview into foreign missionary evangelistic efforts
in Russia. The author researched various historical events that led to their worldview aspects of:
hopelessness; lack of trust; submissiveness; prejudice; and identification with Russian
Orthodoxy. Post-Soviet Russians, born after 1980, are the other generation the author discovered.
They have had different experiences from the Soviet Russians, which have led to their
worldview aspects of rebelliousness, openness, and hope. After a worldview analysis, multiple
practical suggestions are provided for the foreign missionary on how to implement these
worldview elements into his ministry to Soviet and post-Soviet Russians in St. Petersburg so that
this problem of declining spiritual fruit in Russia may be reversed.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

Definitions
This thesis presents conclusions and recommendations from research conducted in St.
Petersburg, Russia to help foreign missionaries understand worldview differences between
Soviet and post-Soviet Russians. For the purposes of this thesis, a Soviet Russian is a person
born and currently living in Russia who effectively remembers living during the times of the
Soviet Union. A post-Soviet Russian is a person born and currently living in Russia that does not
effectively remember living during the times of the Soviet Union because he or she was too
young or not yet born. From an analysis of the questionnaires the author conducted in St.
Petersburg,1 it was determined that Soviet Russians are those born in 1980 and earlier, and postSoviet Russians are those born after 1980. The actual birth date could vary per person and fall a
few years before or after this date, but this birth date marked a substantial worldview shift among
Russians in St. Petersburg.
Another vital term for this thesis is worldview, which is defined as “the culturally
structured set of assumptions (including values and commitments / allegiances) underlying how a
people perceive and respond to reality.”2 A foreign missionary in Russia is someone from a
different country sent by a church seeking to communicate the Gospel, teach, and make disciples
of Russians as laid out in Matthew 28:18-20. Religious conversion is the self-identification of

1. The questionnaire was approved by the IRB.
2. Charles H. Kraft, “Culture, Worldview and Contextualization,” quoted in Ralph D. Winter and Steven C.
Hawthorne, eds., Perspectives on the World Christian Movement: A Reader, 4th ed. (Pasadena, CA:
William Carey Library, 2009), 401.
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one as an adherent to a specific religion. Thus, a true religious conversion to Christianity
involves a worldview-changing repentance and faith in Jesus Christ, which identifies one with
Christ. From a missionary perspective, spiritual fruit includes true religious conversions to
Christianity and what should arise from such conversions, such as baptism and involvement in a
church.

Problem
The problem is that very few foreign missionaries have seen much fruit from their labors
in Russia since the early 1990s, something which will be proved. One former American foreign
missionary to St. Petersburg confirmed this problem in his ministry, revealing that the spiritual
fruit was less from an already low amount during the latter years of his ministry from 1997 to
2015.3 Likewise, a current American foreign missionary who has worked with college students
in St. Petersburg since 2009 has noticed little interest in the Gospel.4 A current American Baptist
foreign missionary who has served in St. Petersburg since 1996 said that the first half of his
ministry was much easier and that he experienced more fruit than the second half. Moreover, he
said professions of faith in Jesus Christ without baptisms or commitments to join a church were a
common experience during the first half of his ministry.5
This continual problem inspired the research of different worldviews between Soviet and
post-Soviet Russians. The author has researched this lack of spiritual fruit to determine if it is the
result of a lack of understanding of the worldview differences between post-Soviet Russians and
Soviet Russians and/or the result of a lack of worldview implementation into ministry efforts. In
3. Former American missionary, Facebook message to author, February 20, 2017.
4. Current American missionary, Facebook message to author, February 20, 2017.
5. American Baptist missionary, interview by author, St. Petersburg, Russia, February 22, 2017.
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a 1991 survey, Andrew Greeley discovered that 22 percent of Russians who had previously
claimed to be atheists conversely claimed to be theists at this time; other quantitative surveys in
this period verified these claims.6 Furthermore, it was observed, “Religious conversion of some
kind appeared to be a common phenomenon in the former Soviet Union after the fall of
Communism.”7 For instance, “Opinion polls taken through 1988 reveal that 8–10 percent of the
population professed to be religious, while in 1992, 40 percent of those surveyed said they were
believers.”8
However, religious conversion to Christianity at this time was possibly not a true, biblical
conversion. A true, biblical conversion requires repentance, as translated from the Greek
metanonia. Lexically, metanonia “means a cardinal change in the way of thinking…or
transformation of the worldview.”9 Sergei Golovin, a Soviet expert on worldview wrote,
“Despite thousands of missionaries and millions of dollars invested immediately in spreading the
gospel in the post-communist world, after a short-term tide, church growth declined back to preperestroika level.”10 Pre-perestroika is the period before 1985. Perestroika ended in 1991. The
reported amount of spiritual fruit that was observed in the 1990s is no longer being observed in
present-day missionary efforts. In a 2011 interview with an IMB missionary to St. Petersburg, he
estimated that 0.2 percent of St. Petersburg consisted of evangelical Christians. In addition, his
team had only been directly involved with leading three people to become believers in the seven
6. Perry L. Glanzer, “Christian Conversion and Culture in Russia: A Clash of Missionary Expectations and
Cultural Pressures,” Missiology 29, no. 3 (July 2001): 319
7. Ibid.
8. Sergei Filatov and Liudmila Vorontsova, “New Russia in Search of an Identity,” quoted in Heyward
Isham, ed., Remaking Russia: Voices from within, Kindle ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 5007-8.
9. Sergei Golovin, “Worldview: The Missing Dimension of Evangelism in Post-Communist Society,”
Religion in Eastern Europe 28, no. 3 (August 2008): 29.
10. Ibid., 27.
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years of his ministry there.11 To further prove the lack of spiritual fruit in the present day in
regards to the neo-charismatic movement in St. Petersburg, Pentillä wrote, “Many neocharismatic groups founded during the 1990s have been dissolved.”12 An all-Russian study
carried out by the Department of Sociology of Religion in the Russian Academy of Science in
2011, which polled 1,600 people in thirty-three different settlements of the Russian Federation,
provides statistics that indicate a lack of fruit of foreign missionary efforts in Russia in the
present time. The survey revealed that just 1 percent of those surveyed identified themselves at
Catholic or Protestant; 63 percent of those polled did not participate in any religious
organization. This percentage comes despite 65 percent of those polled claiming to believe in
God and 72 percent of those polled claiming Russian Orthodoxy as their religion. Additionally,
just 36 percent of respondents believed in the immortality of the soul, down from 48 percent in
2006.13 If the spiritual awakening reported by many Protestant missionaries in the early 1990s
had actually precipitated true conversions, the percentage of Protestants in Russia ought to be
much higher.14 There should certainly be more Russians who believe in the key biblical doctrine
of the immortality of the soul. Additionally, there should be a much higher correlation between
participation in religious organizations and belief in God.
Golovin clearly revealed the descent of Christianity in Russia from the proclaimed
spiritual awakening to the collapse to its current minute state. Eighty percent of people
11. IMB missionary, interview by author, St. Petersburg, Russia, October 11, 2013.
12. Maija Penttilä, “Saint Peter’s New Churches: The Indigenization of Neo-charismatic Christianity in St.
Petersburg,” Nordic Journal of Religion & Society 27, no. 1 (2014), 20, 35. The neo-charismatic movement
is the third wave of the Pentecostal movement, which started in the 1980s-1990s.
13. Yu. Yu. Sinelina, “Новые Тенденции в Изменении Религиозности Россиян [New Trends in
Religiosity of Russians],” Материалы IV Всероссийского социологического конгресса [Proceedings of
the IV All-Russian Congress of Sociology] 14 (February 2012): 784-5.
14. Sergei Filatov, “Orthodoxy in Russia: Post-atheist Faith,” Studies in World Christianity 14, no. 3
(2008): 188.
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considered themselves to be Christians in the early 1990s. The number of new religious
organizations coincides with this spiritual proclamation, showing 7.7 percent and 8.5 percent
annual increases in 1991 and 1992 respectively. However, this percentage quickly fell to 0.6
percent in 1994,15 and by the latter portion of the 1990s “the number of baptisms eventually
declined to a level, lower than right before the communist collapse.”16 Furthermore, “Church
attendance reached saturation and did not grow any more since 1995-1996.”17 Continuing this
idea into near to the present day, Walter Sawatsky, a professor of church history and mission,
concluded, “In the short space of a mere 15 years, post-communist societies had shifted from
representing the new missionary challenge to becoming one of the more resolutely secular and
post Christian parts of the world.”18
Finally, statistics resulting from a questionnaire that the author conducted support a very
low amount of spiritual fruit in the present day. Four hundred and fifty Russians who were living
in St. Petersburg at the time of the survey participated in the questionnaire, and the results in
Figure 1 show a higher percentage among post-Soviet Russians of self-proclaimed atheists and
agnostics than any religion, excluding Russian Orthodoxy. Additionally, as seen in Figure 2,
among those post-Soviet Russians born after 1990, atheism/agnosticism surpasses Russian
Orthodoxy as the most professed belief system. The evidence from several missionaries to St.
Petersburg, Golovin, Penttilä, Sinelina, Filatov, and the author’s questionnaire provide solid
evidence to reasonably believe that very few foreign missionaries have seen much fruit from

15. Golovin, 31-2.
16. Ibid., 32.
17. Ibid., 32-3.
18. "Tensions Between Evangelical Protestants in the Former Soviet Union and America Since 1989 - a
Reflective Commentary," Religion in Eastern Europe 27, no. 4 (November 2007): 26.
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their labors in Russia since the illusion of a spiritual harvest in the early 1990s.

Figure 1. Comparison of the Religious Identifications of Post-Soviet Russians

7

Figure 2. Atheism/Agnosticism vs. Russian Orthodoxy Religious Identification Comparison

Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the problem of very few missionaries seeing
spiritual fruit in Russia since the early 1990s’ spiritual harvest illusion. This analysis will be
executed so that the missionary can have an understanding and practical working knowledge of
the worldviews of Soviet Russians versus post-Soviet Russians. The missionary will also learn
necessary information on how to build relationships with post-Soviet Russians and Soviet
Russians, reach them for Christ, and involve them in his church planting effort.
The process begins by analyzing key historic background events which have contributed
to Soviet Russians’ worldview. The key background events researched in this thesis are: the
extinguishing of Christianity; communism; corruption; and missions in the early 1990s. The
author will use these events to show how they contribute the Soviet Russian worldview aspects
of hopelessness, difficulty trusting, submissiveness, prejudice, and identification with Russian
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Orthodoxy. Each of these tenants of the Soviet Russian worldview will be analyzed in the
present day to equip the foreign missionary to communicate the Gospel, teach, and disciple
Soviet Russians.
The analysis will spread to post-Soviet Russians to compare and contrast their
background events with that of the Soviet Russians. Post-Soviet Russian worldview aspects
include rebelliousness, openness, and hope. These aspects of the post-Soviet worldview will each
be analyzed in the present day to show the foreign missionary how to communicate the Gospel,
teach, and disciple this population. Finally, a summary, conclusion, and author’s reflection will
be made based on the worldview analysis results of the Soviet Russians and post-Soviet
Russians.

Importance of the Problem
The author is uniquely qualified to address this problem since he currently lives in St.
Petersburg, Russia and is in the same generation as post-Soviet Russians. Additionally, as a
missionary to St. Petersburg, he can see and experience this situation and question people firsthand. Foreign missionaries in Russia are struggling to reach people because of the assumption
that the post-Soviet Russians have a worldview like the Soviet Russians. A proclaimed spiritual
awakening and harvest took place between 1990 and 1992.19 However, the rate of church
planting has decreased since this period, which led Golovin to call this harvest an illusion;
transformation of worldview through true repentance did not take place.20 Ignorance of the postSoviet worldview is hindering missionary efforts and should not continue any longer. This thesis

19. Golovin, 32-3.
20. 27-32.
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will benefit foreign missionaries in Russia striving to reach both Soviet and post-Soviet Russians
by expanding upon current knowledge of each generation’s worldview.

Position on the Problem
The research will reveal that post-Soviet Russians have a much different worldview,
which is more rebellious, open, and hopeful than the hopeless, distrusting, submissive,
prejudicial, and Russian Orthodox worldview of the Soviet Russians. Due to Russia’s illpreparedness to handle capitalism in the early 1990s, it was a common occurrence for working
Russians to go without salary for months. Sometimes they would “receive pay in the form of
consumer products like vodka or even tombstones.”21 This situation likely contributed to the
hopeless worldview of Soviet Russians. A questionnaire conducted among Russians living in St.
Petersburg, which is analyzed later in this work, reveals a greater lack of trust of people in
general within the Soviet Russian worldview than the post-Soviet, as observed in Figure 3.22
Lyudmila Igumnova wrote a statement that shows the submissive worldview of Soviet Russians:
“Most people in Russia can easily accept authoritarian rule and refuse to enjoy their rights and
freedoms.”23 Some of the prejudice of Russians is revealed by Yale Richmond when he
explained that Soviet Russians, in general, prefer their way and culture to other cultures,24 and
this can make them prejudiced against Americans. Additionally, as seen in the Figure 4

21. Sydney Schultze, Culture and Customs of Russia (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 20.
22. Due to the small percentage of Soviet and post-Soviet Russians that reported no trust, 100 percent
stacked bars are implemented to aid in the visualization of a greater lack of trust among Soviet Russians in
comparison to post-Soviet Russians.
23. "Russia's Strategic Culture Between American and European Worldviews," Journal of Slavic Military
Studies 24, no. 2 (April 2011): 258.
24. From Nyet to Da, 4th ed., Kindle ed. (Boston, MA: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2009), 21.
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comparison to post-Soviet Russians, a higher percentage of Soviet Russians have a negative
impression of foreigners in St. Petersburg.25 Moreover, a higher percentage of Soviet Russians
are less likely to trust a foreigner than a Russian according to Figure 5. Lastly, it is evident from
questionnaires analyzed later in this work that a significantly larger percentage of Soviet
Russians identify with Russian Orthodoxy than post-Soviet Russians, which has a diverse effect
on their worldviews.
Regarding post-Soviet Russians, their rebelliousness is illustrated by an incident that
occurred shortly before Vladimir Putin was elected president for a third time in March 2012.
Members of a Russian female punk rock band had publicly protested Putin inside the Cathedral
of Christ the Savior in Red Square in Moscow.26 They screamed, “Mother Mary, please drive
Putin away.”27 They were quickly arrested and imprisoned for hooliganism.28 Not long after this
in June 2012, Putin signed a law imposing heavier fines on protesters, over 120 times higher than
previously.29 Additionally, there is a group of mainly post-Soviet Russians called Весна, or
Spring. This group is for young active citizens of Russia whose goal is to change the corrupt
regime by building a system based on democracy and human rights in St. Petersburg and in

25. Due to the small percentage of Soviet and post-Soviet Russians that reported disliking foreigners, 100
percent stacked bars are implemented to aid in the visualization of a greater dislike among Soviet Russians
in comparison to post-Soviet Russians.
26. Laura Smith-Spark, “Russian Court Imprisons Pussy Riot Band Members on Hooliganism Charges,”
CNN International Edition, August 18, 2012, under “Europe,”
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/17/world/europe/russia-pussy-riot-trial/ (accessed December 4, 2016).
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. David M. Herszenhorn, “New Russian Law Assesses Heavy Fines on Protesters,” The New York Times,
June 8, 2012, under “Europe,” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/world/europe/putin-signs-law-withharsh-fines-for-protesters-in-russia.html (accessed December 4, 2016).
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Russia. They pride themselves on not only talking, but also doing.30 Vkontakte is a social
network based in St. Petersburg, and Весна’s main Vkontakte group has almost five thousand
members.31 This group demonstrates that thousands of post-Soviet Russians in St. Petersburg
want change and are willing to rebel in order to make it happen.
Additionally, post-Soviet Russians tend to be more open in their worldview. When
conducting an English ministry in the center of St. Petersburg, the author noticed that the
younger Russians are much more willing to answer personal discussion questions openly than
the older Soviet Russians. There is a group created and led by post-Soviet Russians in St.
Petersburg that helps foreigners practice the Russian language. This group promotes open
discussion, even discussing touchy subjects like religion and politics. There are nearly two
thousand members in its Facebook group, and over fifty people regularly cram into a small room
for meetings.32 These groups show that there is openness among post-Soviet Russians, both to
foreigners and discussion. Figure 6 reveals the increased hopefulness found amongst post-Soviet
Russians when compared to Soviet Russians’ worldview. More post-Soviet, atheist and agnostic
Russians showed hope that good would triumph over evil in the end than Soviet Russians.

30. “О Нас [About Us],” Весна Молодёжное Движение [Spring Youth Movement], http://spbvesna.ru/home (accessed December 4, 2016).
31. “Движение «Весна» [“Spring” Movement],” VKontakte, https://vk.com/spb_vesna (accessed
December 13, 2016).
32. “Russian Learners and Speakers Club,” Facebook,
https://www.facebook.com/groups/648514215190147/ (accessed December 4, 2016).
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Figure 3. Comparison of Likelihood to Trust an Unknown Person

Figure 4. Comparison Between Impression of Foreigners in St. Petersburg
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Figure 5. Comparison Between Likeliness to Trust Foreigners Over Native Russians

Figure 6. Comparison of Atheists/Agnostics’ Hopefulness of Whether Good Will Triumph Over Evil
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Limitations
The scope of the thesis falls within the scope of church planting by biblical conversion
growth in St. Petersburg by an American foreign missionary. This thesis may be limited by a
lack of full understanding of the Russian language and an incomplete analysis of what has
worked in church planting.
The questionnaire was mainly conducted via the Internet, which further limits the
questionnaire results to a larger percentage of younger people. Plus, the analysis does not include
the extremely wealthy. The questionnaire was primarily shared with those who were in a social
networking group that practices English with foreigners. This situation, in combination with 450
results, limits the data received by questionnaires to be analyzed more for trends than exact
percentages because of the higher chance of statistical error. The Levada Center in Russia
usually interviews 1,600 respondents in regions throughout Russia to provide statistics on
Russia. The author contacted the Levada Center to see about the possibility of using them to
conduct this survey, but they wanted to charge the author over ten thousand dollars.33 The author
contacted another similar company in Russia, Online Market Intelligence, but they refused to
conduct the survey because of the religious nature of some of the questions.34 The Barna Group
usually uses one thousand respondents in their surveys. The more surveys that can be conducted
the better, as it reduces the error rate.
It is important that individuals are selected randomly,35 but this was practically
impossible from an individual standpoint in St. Petersburg since usually only those who feel that

33. Levada Center, e-mail message to author, November 3, 2016.
34. Online Market Intelligence, e-mail message to author, November 7, 2016.
35. Daniel Im, e-mail message to author, August 26, 2016.
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they have something worthwhile to say will contribute to such questionnaires.36 The main
difference that limited the complete randomness is that most of the individuals who answered the
questionnaire were interested in practicing English. Also, there was a slightly inflated number of
Protestants that took the questionnaire due to links with the author, and the questionnaire was
mainly answered online via social networks. This limited a large portion of the data to those that
are on social networks. Since the author was just interested in one city and had limited time and
resources in addition to some circumstances described in the next section, he felt that 450
respondents were sufficient to make conclusions from the data. However, the precise percentages
are subject to a margin of error, somewhere around 5 percent.37 To compensate for the total lack
of randomness in the surveying, the author utilized stratified sampling, with methods such as not
including Protestant answers at times, since the percentage of Protestants in St. Petersburg is
negligible. Additionally, more women took the questionnaire than men, approximately 70
percent women to 30 percent men. The more women answering may have had to do with
women, in general, being more open to share their opinions than men. Any compensating for
randomness will be described throughout the thesis when necessary. Due to this issue of
randomness, differing interpretations of questions, and the chance that some person would
provide false answers, the author thought it would be wise to conduct interviews to provide a
more complete picture of Russian worldview. The Graduate & Faculty Research and Instruction
Librarian at Jerry Falwell Library recommended gathering this additional qualitative data from
personal interviews.38 However, with a sample size of four interviewees, there is a limit to their

36. Randy L. Miller, e-mail message to author, August 26, 2016.
37. Daniel Im.
38. Randy L. Miller.
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knowledge of worldview and history to provide exhaustive information for an entire
generation.39

Research
The research conducted for the purposes of this thesis included an analysis of scholarly
articles and books about the history and worldview of Soviet Russians and post-Soviet Russians.
The research began among electronic databases and libraries. Data was recorded in a Word
document and organized by source with keywords noted and with questions and conclusions
formed. Bibliographical leads from each of the sources researched were also noted. Quantitative
and qualitative methods were used via questionnaires and interviews, respectively.

Quantitative Method
Questionnaires were given via quantitative method to determine an approximate birth
year of the post-Soviet generation in terms of practical worldview. The author distributed his
questionnaire to Russians through the means of social networks, on the street, and within an
English teaching ministry that he leads in the center of St. Petersburg. The author used
SurveyMonkey, a service company that allows for the creation, collection, advertising, and
analysis of questionnaires. Forty-seven out of eighty physically distributed questionnaires were
anonymously answered on paper and entered manually into SurveyMonkey for analysis by the
author. Out of the forty-seven, forty-four met the criteria of the respondent being born in Russia
and being a current resident of St. Petersburg. Four hundred and forty-one questionnaires were
anonymously answered by clicking a link to the questionnaire on SurveyMonkey. This link was
shared via VKontakte and Facebook to acquaintances and those in an English learning group led
39. The interview questions were approved by the IRB.
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by the author on VKontakte. Some of these people shared the link with their acquaintances and
co-workers. Out of the 441, 406 met the criteria of the study and were used. Thus, 450
questionnaires out of 488 were admissible for this thesis.
Questionnaire questions were designed to uncover the worldview of Russians living in St.
Petersburg. Therefore, neutral and none-of-the-above answer choices were extremely limited.
Instructions were given at the beginning of the questionnaire to choose the best answer of the
options provided. However, limiting choices to a best answer caused problems for the author
since some potential respondents chose not to answer the questions at all. After several people
expressed this concern, the author added an option to provide comments at the end of the
questionnaire so that respondents could answer all the questions and provide their feedback. This
additional option helped to encourage more potential respondents to answer the questions, but
the feedback was not very useful for the purposes of this thesis.
Some precautions were necessary in the creation of the questionnaire and its distribution.
For example, the author avoided using the word “corruption” as an explanation of wealth, opting
instead for the idea of “use of position at work for one’s own ends.”40 This phrase was used to
avoid giving respondents a pejorative label that would immediately bias them from selecting it
and to avoid any discontent about the author’s intentions with the questionnaire. Moreover, the
most meaningful and personal questions were placed toward the end of the questionnaire to
prompt respondents to answer them completely and truthfully.41 Two questions were added in
the first half of the questionnaire that had no significance for the research. These two questions
were added to remove some of the suspicion that any authorities would have of a foreigner
40. Adrian Beck and Ruth Lee, "Attitudes to Corruption Amongst Russian Police Officers and Trainees,"
Crime, Law & Social Change 38, no. 4 (December 2002): 359.
41. Beck and Lee, 359.
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inquiring about worldview and religion.42
Even though Russia is no longer communist and technically is open to various religions,
recent legislation limits missionary activity in Russia. The new law N374-ФЗ on combatting
terrorism has a section on missionary activity. A person in Russia cannot “carry out missionary
activities, objectives and actions which are aimed at: …conducting an extremist activity;
coercion into destroying the family…encouragement to suicide…the motivation of citizens to
refuse to fulfill their civic duties established by law and to commit other illegal acts.”43 Much of
this law is left to the unreliable interpretation of local authorities; this capriciousness in dealing
with religious groups is certainly not new in Russia. A 1997 Law On Freedom of Conscience and
Religious Associations was similarly enforced.44 Handing out any religious literature, including
Bibles, could be considered extremist activity or coercion into destroying the family, especially
if this family of the recipient is of a different religion. The questionnaire itself, while not
providing information about any of the above topics, asked questions about suicide and
submissiveness to the government and could have been considered forbidden missionary activity
to certain legal authorities.
Within the year leading up to the passing of this law, the author knew personally of two
American foreign missionaries in St. Petersburg who were no longer legally allowed in Russia.
One of them decided to hire a lawyer to get the decision reversed. An article came out about this

42. Golovin, 37.
43. “Russian Federation Federal Law: Concerning Changes into the Federal Law ‘Counteracting Terrorism’
and Individual Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding Establishment of Additional Measures
to Counteract Terrorism and the Provision of Social Safety,” Slavic Gospel Association, July 29, 2016,
under “New Anti-Evangelism Law in Russia,” http://www.sga.org/download/English-translation-ofRussian-anti-evangelism-law.-web-version.pdf (accessed December 6, 2016).
44. Olga Kazmina, "Freedom of Religion in Post-Soviet Russia," Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 13,
no. 1-2 (January 2001): 106-7.

19
situation and was titled in an English equivalent of “When God is Powerless Before the FSB.”45
Not long after this article was published, a news crew from Channel 5 came to the church where
they believed this missionary served to conduct interviews with some of the church members.
The news program specifically referred to the English ministry the author of this thesis leads.
Fortunately, the author’s name was not used during this program, since the deported missionary
was accused of espionage.46 After this, the same news crew went to a different English ministry
to try to talk to an American foreign missionary. He declined their interview and was soon
ordered to leave the country. This misfortune, along with the new law, caused the author to be
careful when conducting the necessary research through the questionnaire. Although he did not
stand in the street to conduct these questionnaires, a Russian volunteer from his English ministry
did. She did not have much of a problem finding people willing to stop and answer the questions
at first, but after a while it became much more difficult for her. This difficulty is not surprising,
as the average person will not even extend their hand to accept an ad on the street. The
questionnaires were given in the evenings after working hours in freezing conditions in
November while there was snow on the ground. The author was repeatedly told he would face
much difficulty finding those willing to take his questionnaire in such conditions. These
comments were true, but it was still possible, especially considering that a young, friendly
Russian college student was the one interacting with the respondents. In all, this volunteer
conducted thirty-five of the forty-four physically answered questionnaires. Twenty-seven were

45. Alexander Ermakov, “Когда Бог Бессилен Перед ФСБ [When God is Powerless Before the FSB],”
Фонтанка Петербургская Интернет-Газета [Fontanka Petersburg Online Newspaper], January 25,
2016, under “Обшество [Society],” http://www.fontanka.ru/2016/01/25/111/ (accessed December 4, 2016).
46. Vitaly Vlasenko, “Пастор Петербургского Прихода Оказался Иностранным Шпионом [Pastor of
the Parish of St. Petersburg Turned Out to be a Foreign Spy],” 5 Знак Отличия [5 Mark of Distinction],
February 1, 2016, under “Новости [News],” http://www.5-tv.ru/news/104060/ (accessed December 4,
2016).
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given on the street in the center of St. Petersburg or near a central marketplace, five were
completed by tutors at a university, and three by concierges of dormitories in the city.
The process of creating the questionnaire began with research. In addition to
demographic and the random questions, most of the remaining questions dealt with worldview,
classifiable under these umbrella questions: “Where do we come from?” “Who we are?” and
“Where are we going?”47 The author wrote the questionnaire in English and then translated it.
His Russian language teacher reviewed and assisted in making any necessary adjustments. From
that point, four other university-educated Russians, who knew English and had different levels of
religious knowledge, reviewed the questionnaire and made any other necessary adjustments. One
of these Russians was a translator and an English teacher to Russians and a Russian teacher to
native English speakers. The language teacher and the translator pointed out the Russian word
for submissive, покорный, might have different connotations. For instance, the language teacher
said some people might not want to be known as покорный in general because it can mean they
are weak and easily controlled. She said this word could be a bit provoking to some people, and
the translator said that he was not sure if he would use this word but that he felt people would
understand what was meant by the word in context. As the questionnaires were being answered,
one respondent that questioned the use of this word mentioned that покорный means stupid
sheep, which do not have their own ideas, and непокорный, or unsubmissive, means to be part of
a rebellion.48 Due to these different understandings, the results of the questionnaire showed the
Soviet Russians to be slightly less submissive to the government than post-Soviet Russians,
which contradicts other research and the opinions of the four interviewees. Additionally, other

47. Golovin, 41.
48. VKontakte message to author, October 26, 2016.
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reasons for this discrepancy could be respondents misunderstood what the word meant in the
context of the question or even a fear of identifying as unsubmissive to the government if the
survey results were not truly anonymous.

Qualitative Method
The qualitative method was used in an interview with a Soviet Russian and three postSoviet Russians. Of these four Russians, the one Soviet Russian and two post-Soviet Russians
claimed to believe in God, and one post-Soviet Russian claimed to not believe in God. In order
to give them confidence to answer the questions honestly and to protect them from any issues in
the future that could come from their opinions, the author told them their names would be
withheld. The first interview was conducted with the Soviet Russian. For the remainder of this
thesis, she will be referred to as I1. I1 declined to provide her exact age, which was between
forty-five and fifty. She had been born in St. Petersburg and lived there for her entire life. She
completed higher education and at the time of the interview was an instructor of the Russian
language at a university. She claimed the Bible as her religion but attends Russian Orthodox
Church services. The interview with I1 was conducted in the author’s home and consisted of
fifteen questions in English and Russian. In the two-hour interview, I1 answered primarily in
Russian and corrected any grammatical errors in the questions as she noticed them. The author
recorded her answers in part Russian and part English.49
The interview with the three post-Soviet Russians was conducted during a discussion
time at the author-led English ministry. To find those willing to participate in the interview, the
author asked for volunteers of the ministry’s group on VKontakte. One volunteer was located this

49. I1, interview by author, St. Petersburg, Russia, November 21, 2016.
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way, and the other two volunteered just before the discussion time at the English ministry. The
interview, which was primarily in English, took place with all three of them around a table over
the course of two and a half hours. The author wrote their answers down in English. The
interviewees did not interact with one another, but the interviewees did hear each other’s
answers. It is unlikely that the interviewees hearing each other’s responses affected their answers
any differently than if just the author would have heard their responses. One interviewee was
born in 1985 in Volkhov, a town near St. Petersburg with a population over forty thousand. This
interviewee will be referred to as I2 throughout the rest of this thesis. I2 had been living in St.
Petersburg for six years at the time of the interview and held a Master’s degree. She also claimed
Christianity as her religion.50 Another interviewee was born in 1991 in Archangelsk, a city of
over three hundred thousand in the northern European portion of Russia. For the rest of the
thesis, he will be referred to as I3. At the time of the interview, I3 held a Master’s degree and
claimed to be agnostic.51 The last interviewee was born in 1995 in Kirov, a city of over four
hundred thousand in the Kirov Oblast. She will be referred to as I4 for the rest of the thesis. She
had been living in St. Petersburg for four years and was a university student at the time of the
interview. She claimed Russian Orthodoxy as her religion.52 The data gathered from these
interviews, the 450 questionnaires, and the scholarly sources were correlated to one another in
preparation for this thesis.

50. I2, interview by author, St. Petersburg, Russia, November 24, 2016.
51. I3, interview by author, St. Petersburg, Russia, November 24, 2016.
52. I4, interview by author, St. Petersburg, Russia, November 24, 2016.
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Summary
There are several important aspects of this chapter, beginning with the term definitions,
especially identifying the birth year of post-Soviet Russians as after 1980 and the birth year of
Soviet Russians as 1980 and before. A second key section is the investigation into the lack of
spiritual fruit in St. Petersburg after the spiritual harvest illusion, along with the evidence that
supports this problem. The third aspect is the analysis of the lack of spiritual fruit, which
includes looking at historical events that influenced different aspects of both Soviet and postSoviet worldviews. The analysis of these worldviews will be of practical help to the foreign
missionary by giving him useful information on how to reach and minister to Soviet and postSoviet Russians. The fourth is to consider the limitations of Russian language fluency, lack of
complete randomness with the survey, and primarily using the internet for collecting
questionnaire responses resulting in significantly more post-Soviet Russian responders than
Soviet Russian responders. The fifth is the qualitative and quantitative methods of research along
with the details of the questionnaires and interviews. The remainder of the work will focus on
Soviet Russians and post-Soviet Russians.
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Chapter 2
SOVIET RUSSIANS

History and Key Background Events
The key events that have contributed to the worldview of Soviet Russians are: the
extinguishing of Christianity; communism; corruption; and missions in the early 1990s. In this
section each of these key events will be analyzed to show how they have affected the worldview
of Soviet Russians.

Extinguishing of Christianity
“Religious intolerance became official policy” during the Soviet era because communists
were atheists and saw the Russian Orthodox Church as a threat.53 Communists perceived this
threat due to the ties between the Russian Orthodox Church and the tsars, who claimed they had
divine authority to rule. Thus, “85% of all churches were shut down and the property seized,”54
which led the Russian Orthodox Church to meet underground. If they or members of any other
religion continued to meet publicly, they could face imprisonment or death. Joseph Stalin, the
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1922 to 1953, led a reign of
terror, which, along with preventable famine, led to the death of up to twenty million citizens of
the Soviet Union.55 Starting in 1928, some of the specific legal requirements initiated by Stalin
that contributed to the extinguishing of Christianity included the ability of authorities to remove

53. Timothy L. Gall, ed., Worldmark Encyclopedia of Cultures and Daily Life (Detroit, MI: Gale Research,
1998), 4:334-5.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., 332-3.
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religious leaders from their positions in their religious organizations at will, a law prohibiting
child involvement in religious organizations, and the lack of freedom for religious organizations
to conduct any social activities.56 Up until WWII, these laws were harshly applied, and
Christians were treated without respect.57 These events led to hopelessness, which is prevalent in
Soviet Russian worldview.
The extinguishing of Christianity was not limited to direct attacks on religious
organizations and believers. Soviet Russians were also exposed to antireligious propaganda.58
For instance, consider these “statistics for [the] Voronezh region of the RSFSR (2,511,000
inhabitants): in 1965-6, 101 new books on atheist topics appeared on the shelves of book shops
and libraries…local radio stations had regular programmes on atheist themes, and in 1970 alone
222,620 popular lectures were given on [atheism].”59 Issues of Bezbozhnik, which was a Soviet
anti-religious newspaper that literally means “atheist,” claimed that Jesus Christ was the first and
most wicked moonshiner. This information was accompanied by an illustration of Jesus giving
men moonshine, apparently making them ill.60 Another issue of Bezbozhnik incorporated antiAmericanism with anti-religion. There is an illustration of the Statue of Liberty hanging a man,
along with a verse of Scripture and announcement that this was happening in God’s Country, the

56. Christel Lane, Christian Religion in the Soviet Union: A Sociological Study (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1978), 27-8.
57. Ibid., 28.
58. Zoe Knox, "Church, State, and Belief in Post-Soviet Russia," Russian Review 71, no. 1 (January 2012):
123.
59. Lane, 28
60. K. Urbetisa, “Антиалкогольный Выпуск [The Anti-Alcohol Edition],” Безбожник у Станка [The
Atheist at His Bench] 19 (1929), http://dic.academic.ru/pictures/wiki/files/66/Bezhnoznik_u_stanka_191929.jpeg (accessed December 6, 2016).
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United States of America.61
Such propaganda has continued today and still has a profound impact on the worldview
of Soviet Russians. This propaganda has led them to be prejudiced toward Americans and to lack
trust toward foreign missionaries. “Numerous exposés in the Western media with their
characteristic references to anti-cult ‘experts’ have also been used against newer religious
minorities operating in Russia,”62 such as Baptists. In fact, the Russian Orthodox Church has
posted signs on Baptist churches and other Baptist meeting places that warn people, “Don’t let
Baptists buy your soul with humanitarian aid.”63 Reaching further, “Orthodox regularly employ
local press, radio, and television to denigrate non-Orthodox faiths.”64 This type of propaganda
causes the general population of St. Petersburg to refer to the Baptist missionary from America
as a sectarian, which in their eyes is a cultist. Baptists and other Protestants often become lumped
together with other religious groups, such as Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Scientologists
as people who are strange and tear apart families. This propaganda causes more than just a lack
of trust toward foreign missionaries, but also steers people toward Russian Orthodoxy because it
is considered safer by Russians and not a sect that tears apart families.

61. N. Kohout, “Негр, Повешенный на Статуе Свободы [Negro Hung on the Statute of Liberty],”
Безбожник у Станка [The Atheist at His Bench] 22 (1930),
http://dic.academic.ru/pictures/wiki/files/66/Bezhnoznik_u_stanka_US_1930.jpeg (accessed December 6,
2016).
62. Marat S. Shterin and James T. Richardson, “Effects of the Western Anti-Cult Movement on the
Development of Laws Concerning Religion in Post-Communist Russia,” Journal of Church and State 42,
no. 2 (Spring 2000): 261.
63. Mark Elliott, "Orthodox-Protestant Relations in the Post-Soviet Era," Religion in Eastern Europe 23,
no. 5 (October 2003): 40.
64. Ibid.
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Communism
The worldview of Soviet Russians is affected by communism and issues associated with
communism, including after its collapse. “Under Communism, Russia was one of the world's
largest bureaucracies.”65 After the end of Communism in 1991, the manner that other Russians
treated each other in personal relationships was continually affected. For instance, in the
mentality of Soviet Russians, power structure and levels of inequality were still prevalent.66 This
contributed to prejudice in the worldview of Soviet Russians toward different classes.
Traditionally and culturally in Russia, those who are independent tend to be the ones in
power, and the dependent tend to be dominated. Furthermore, Russians have become accustomed
to this idea of being dependent on one another. The idea of submitting to one another is a biblical
principal in the context of being in reverence of Christ.67 However, the idea in present-day
Russia, which flowed from the communist times and is even present in churches, is that the
lower class expects decisions to be made for them; they simply follow along. Even among
classrooms at universities and schools in the Soviet Union, a teacher was to direct the class from
his or her higher position without input from the students. This tendency shows submissiveness
in the worldview of such Soviet Russians. This situation in churches, unfortunately, can give the
pastor too much power over a Soviet Russian congregation, create personal pressure on him, and
diminish the opportunity for balance among the congregation. For instance, if the congregation
desires direction from the leaders of the church without providing feedback or questioning, then
the church will lack the completeness of the body of Christ. 1 Thessalonians 5:12-13 reveals that

65. Margo Menconi, “Understanding and Relating to the Three Cultures of Cross-Cultural Ministry in
Russia,” Missiology 24, no. 4 (October 1996): 524.
66. Ibid.
67. Eph. 5:21, English Standard Version.
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the congregation should respect and esteem the leaders of the church in love; however, they are
also to test everything and hold on to what is good.68 Additionally, the pastor should be above
reproach.69 If he is not, then the members of the church should approach him privately with
witnesses.70
Communism also created uniformity, even among salaries, which continued into the early
1990s, apart from a few economic elite.71 This situation did not permit a middle class during the
Soviet times. Worldview aspects of lack of trust and hopelessness resulted since everyone was
on the same level regardless of intelligence or effort, except for the corrupt.
Life in the USSR during the times of communism was difficult. A significant amount of
time was used just waiting in lines to purchase food from poorly stocked grocery stores. Most
people would not set aside a specific time to go grocery shopping, but made it a part of their
regular life to constantly keep an open eye to what was available and buying it then. Soviet-made
clothing also lacked in a variety of options and quality, leading to a black market which allowed
for higher quality and rarer Western-made clothing to be purchased.72 These difficult times
finding goods caused Russians to be more hopeful during Soviet times, thinking that things could
only get better going forward.73 Additionally, the government provided housing assistance, but
now this is not the case. The communist government provided much more for Russians than the
present type of democracy. Thus, because Soviet Russians are older and there is little indication
68. 1 Thess. 5:21.
69. 1 Tim. 3:2.
70. 1 Tim. 5:19.
71. Menconi, 527.
72. Gall, 336.
73. I2.
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of the overall quality of life improving, they have less hope than post-Soviet Russians.74
Communism’s restriction of access to information led to the Soviet Russians being more
discriminatory than post-Soviet Russians. Soviet Russians lacked information about many
cultures outside of the Soviet Union.75 They just did what they were told,76 and many Soviet
Russians in the St. Petersburg area were prejudiced toward Jews and those in communities in
northern Siberia.77 I1, the Soviet Russian, thought Soviet Russians to be more prejudiced because
of a different reason than the other interviewees. She thought their age and experiences taught
them to be more prejudiced. Additionally, she brought out some old Russian phrases that Soviet
Russians still say to this day that reveal their preference for Russians to foreigners. The first was
старый друг лучше новых двух, which translates to “an old friend is better than two new ones.”
In the context of Soviet Russians preferring Russians to foreigners, this phrase means, why
would they want to make a new friend with a foreigner when they already have Russian friend?
The second phrase was своя рубашка ближе к телу, which translates to “your shirt is closer to
your body.” In the context of the preference of Russians over foreigners, this saying means that
Soviet Russians prefer Russians because they are closer to them. She also said that Soviet Union
textbooks in school were different than the ones used now and contributed to this idea of
preference of Russians over foreigners.
Communism also caused children to be subjected to lies from teachers and organizations.
Regarding childhood in the USSR, Helen, a Soviet Russian, recounts that her mother, who lived
before the Soviet Union existed, believed in God. However, Helen did not believe in God. The
74. I1.
75. See I2; I3; I4.
76. I3.
77. I2.
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teachers at her school taught her that there was no God, and she knew that she was not allowed to
go to church with her mother like her mother wanted. She joined communist youth organizations,
which taught her communist traditions. Eventually, these youth organizations made it difficult
for her to trust people because she was constantly lied to.78 Furthermore, I1 revealed that she felt
communism made Soviet Russians feel closed off as they realized that information was being
kept from them. These situations contributed to a lack of trust in their worldview.
David Satter, an American journalist and expert on Russia and the Soviet Union, revealed
the horrific past of communistic times in the USSR. Satter makes it clear that Russia in the
present day has overlooked much of the terrible communist past and the lives that were lost from
communistic terror.
During the period 1929 to 1953, eighteen million persons passed through the Soviet labor
camp system. The artificial famine of 1932-33 took seven million lives. Nearly a million
persons were shot during the Great Terror of 1937-38. In all, the number of persons who
died in peacetime as a result of the actions of the Communist authorities is estimated at
twenty million. If one considers the demographic impact on three generations (1917-53),
it can be estimated that the total population loss— those killed and those who were never
born— comes to 100 million persons.79
Despite this significant loss of lives, there is no memorial or museum in Russia to remember
these victims.80 This lack of recognition is strange in a country that is full of monuments and
museums to remember so many other parts of its rich past. Regarding the Great Terror and life in
St. Petersburg, then called Leningrad, the founder of the city’s puppet theatre described the fear
people had on average nights. In an entry dated November 22, 1937, she wrote, “They don’t
arrest people during the day, but what will happen tonight no one knows…. Every single person

78. Glanzer, 322.
79. It Was a Long Time Ago, and It Never Happened Anyway: Russia and the Communist Past, Kindle ed.
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 2.
80. Ibid., 3.
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has enough against him to justify arrest and exile to parts unknown…. The majority of people are
living in absolute terror.”81 An example of this absolute terror was described by the personal
story of Natalya Kruk. On September 28, 1937 her father was arrested. There was no reason
given at the time of arrest, just that he “had been exiled for ten years without the right of
correspondence.”82 Eventually, Natalya’s mother realized from rumors that this phrase was a
euphemism for being shot. In 1996 Natalya went to the FSB headquarters in St. Petersburg to
truly learn of her father’s fate. It turns out he was actually arrested for involvement with a
counterrevolutionary group. He had denied this involvement at first on December 12, 1937,
before changing his mind and admitting to this involvement after an interrogation. Because of
the time, there was little to no doubt that torture was used to force a confession, further indicated
by the badly distorted signature of her father on the confession. To complicate matters, Natalya
was distraught when reading that her father had ostensibly died from cardiovascular disease in
1994. When she asked where he had been buried, the FSB could not give her a direct answer.
They gave her a couple of possible burial locations, but his body may have been hurled into the
Neva River.83 Even after reading and hearing this news for the first time, it did not give her any
more closure. There were still many unanswered questions and suspicions from the strange file
she had read. This frightening situation of communistic times strongly contributed to the
submissiveness, hopelessness, and lack of trust among Soviet Russians. If Russians were not
submissive to the government during these terrifying times, then they stood little chance of
survival.

81. Ibid., 78.
82. Ibid., 76.
83. Ibid., 77-8.

32
Communist leaders in Soviet times also forced Soviet Russians into submission through
starvation. In 1932, there was a great famine, and communist leadership starved peasants who
had turned to theft due to the huge collection of their harvest by the government. Many rural
areas were emptied of their harvest completely, thus leading to the death of five to seven million
Soviets.84 Again, communism strongly contributed to a hopeless, submissive worldview among
Soviet Russians.

Corruption
The state of the Soviet Union was “poor and therefore could not pay those who worked
for it decently.”85 This situation led to corruption. Tolstoy, a famous pre-Soviet Russian writer,
shed some light on a situation that was prevalent before the Soviet era and ballooned upon the
entrance of it. Tolstoy was very concerned for the poor. However, he realized that it was
impossible to help the poor while living a lifestyle that required the existence of the poor to
work. This led him to discover, “The root of the matter lay in the corrupt attitude of society to
the idea of work,”86 and, furthermore, “One class of the community can exist only at the expense
of another class who fulfil its perverted desires.”87 Tolstoy is an influential historical person in
Russian culture today because of his writings and philosophies. Additionally, Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn, another Russian writer who was eventually exiled, wrote in the 1970s about a lie

84. Ibid., 32-3.
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that the citizens of the USSR had to participate in because of government corruption.88 These
two men are both regularly quoted and referenced among Russians, especially those in St.
Petersburg, which is considered the cultural capital of Russia. Their writings have contributed to
the hopelessness and lack of trust in the worldview of Soviet Russians. Why should they trust
their employer to pay them? Why should they trust the government to treat them fairly? What is
the point of hard work if someone can take the benefits of hard work away from them?
During the Russian Revolution of 1917, which eventually led to the start of the Soviet
Union in 1922, this slogan was commonly declared among the revolutionists: “Steal what has
been stolen!”89 It was “derived from the notion that the rich people were thieves and wealth was
to be plundered or pillaged.”90 Crime and business was often connected at this time in Russia,
and government bureaucrats and military officers could control businessmen because of their
power over the working class. Government bureaucrats and military officers often took
advantage of the working class through means of corruption, causing the working class to lose
status and wealth. After the Revolution, the Communist Party had control of the Soviet Union
and subsequently became very rich through corruption. Communist Party officials merely
continued with the current system of corruption that was prevalent in government leaders before
them and continued functioning this way into the 1990s.
In 1998, this corruption precipitated a financial crisis. Small businesses were unable to
remain operational, lacking the political power to obtain favors from the super-rich or the
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politically connected. The black market, illegal under Soviet rule, flooded the economy with
overpriced foreign goods.91 What few businesses could withstand these pressures were faced
with extortion for protection money from criminal bosses.92 All of this led to the inevitable
perception that a handful of families controlled all business in Russia, and this caused the view
of economy as manipulation in the eyes of post-Soviet Russia.93 Combined, these factors made
hopelessness and a lack of trust all but inevitable.
The interview with the Soviet Russian I1 shed more light on the issue of corruption.
According to I1, corruption was less publicly talked about during Soviet times even though there
was more corruption. She felt this situation led to more Soviet Russians being pessimistic than
post-Soviet Russians. This concurs with a hopeless worldview, in general, among Soviet
Russians.
Corruption was not only limited to the government and businesses, but it was also in
churches. There has been much corruption among the Russian Orthodox Church, even during the
Soviet times. Priests received high salaries in comparison to other Soviets during this time.94
This condition possibly contributes to the negative attitude toward Russian Orthodoxy, a position
held by one-fifth of Soviet Russians surveyed who identified as Russian Orthodox, as seen in
Figure 7. This statistic has been verified despite more than twice as many Soviet Russians
claiming Russian Orthodoxy over any other religion, as seen in Figure 8. Thus, Russian
Orthodoxy is ingrained into the worldview of Soviet Russians, despite evidence of corruption.
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Figure 7. Soviet Russian Impression of the Russian Orthodox Church Among Those Who Are Russian Orthodox

Figure 8. Comparison of the Religious Identifications of Soviet Russians
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Missions in the Early 1990s
Whereas Stalin’s law in 1929 subjugated all churches, the new law passed in September
1990 “gave believers virtually complete religious liberty.”95 Soon after this law was passed, “The
Soviet Union was inundated with foreign evangelists and missionaries.”96 This new law on
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Belief guaranteed “freedom of worship for all faiths,
including foreign religious associations, [and] encouraged a boom in religious activity ranging
from evangelism, pilgrimage, religious education, new religious movements and the resurgence
of indigenous religious practices.”97 However, Soviet Russians began accusing this new law for
the chaos that ensued from a sudden wave of foreigners who brought various religious messages,
which many of them had never been exposed to before.98 To some Soviet Russians, this freedom
of religious choice threatened the country’s main historical religious traditions.99 “In the 1990s
the Russian Orthodox Church was especially upset about Western Protestant evangelicals who
sent missionaries to Russia as though it were not already a Christian (Orthodox) nation.”100
Because the Russian Orthodox Church represents values that are part of a Russian’s historical
identity,101 many Soviet Russians in the present day choose to identify with the church and
accept her stance on issues, including the negative feeling toward foreign missionaries.
95. Michael Bourdeaux, “Russian Renewal: The Complex Face of Orthodoxy,” Christian Century, April 4,
2001, http://www.christiancentury.org/article/%252Frussian-renewal (accessed April 19, 2013), 1.
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Moreover, a post-Soviet Russian that claimed to believe in God said that Russian Orthodoxy is in
a Russian’s blood.102
In the early 1990s foreign missionaries in Russia held several large evangelistic meetings.
One such meeting was a Billy Graham crusade in Moscow in 1992, which was accompanied by
the Russian Army Choir.103 This event showed a military and, thus, a government approval of
such meetings, which probably made Soviet Russians even more comfortable participating in
these types of gatherings. Soviet Russians were interested in the large evangelistic meetings that
foreign missionaries held, and so they went. Looking back, Soviet Russians who now attend
Russian Orthodox Church services feel that these meetings were very strange. They even
wondered why they went to such meetings and stated that they would not go to such meetings
now.104 Perhaps the people who went to these meetings were attempting “to fill the ‘moral
vacuum’ of post-Soviet Russia.”105 There was an identity crisis in the early 1990s,106 and
amongst all of the corruption there was much hope for positive change among Soviet Russians.
Perhaps this crisis made it easier to go to such meetings and to accept what was being said from
foreigners of whom they had little to no knowledge. They had the desire to be religious: not to
necessarily understand religion, but to go through the motions.
Attempting to include the Russian Orthodox Church in the evangelization of Russia in
1992, Western evangelical missionaries reached out to the church in hopes to evangelize Russia
102. I4.
103. “Russian Army Choir At 1992 Moscow Crusade,” Billy Graham Evangelistic Association,
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with her. During Mission Volga, there were sermons in stadiums and the distribution of
literature.107 However, the nature of the invitations at the end of the services ultimately
undermined any cooperation;108 around one hundred thousand people out of the 150,000 at these
meetings were being led in a unison prayer to accept Christ during the invitation.109 The Russian
Orthodox Church did not think this was appropriate, finding immediate conversion in such a
setting unlikely. Russians viewed stadiums as places for fun, rather than for spiritual reflection;
so everything, including the invitation, was not taken very seriously in a spiritual sense.110 Thus,
it is reasonable to conclude that there were significantly less than one hundred thousand true,
biblical conversions that resulted from such invitations in such situations. Soviet Russians
observed these massive amounts of false confessions over time and it led them to go back to the
thing they considered to be safe and what identified them most as Russian, the Russian Orthodox
Church. Even the mindset of Soviet Russians, in general, is this: “To be Russian is to be
Orthodox.”111 So the well-intended but insensible manner of foreign missionaries, in general, in
the early 1990s drove Soviet Russians into a worldview that involves Russian Orthodoxy.
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Worldview of Soviet Russians
In this section the present situations that contribute to the worldview of Soviet Russians
will be analyzed within these five different aspects of Soviet Russian worldview: hopelessness,
lack of trust, submissiveness, prejudice, and identification with Russian Orthodoxy. As these
present situations are analyzed, so will be the Soviet Russian worldview in relation to how the
foreign missionary could effectively reach out to Soviet Russians for true conversion and
discipleship.

Hopelessness
Even from the bleak expressions alone of people while riding on the Metro, one visiting
St. Petersburg quickly wonders why everyone seems so sad. St. Petersburg is the largest
northernmost city in the world and receives an average of seventy-five sunny days per year. With
most of those days coming together in the summer,112 it is no wonder why people in St.
Petersburg can seem this way to an outsider. “To live in Soviet times often meant not being able
to define your own future,”113 and this type of hopelessness remains among Soviet Russians. For
instance, “Russia ranks third among countries with billionaires (after the U.S. and Germany), yet
elderly people barely survive on minuscule state pensions.”114 This social inequality causes fear
and resentment among the elderly Soviet Russians. The government helps less now than in
Soviet times, leaving people to fend more for themselves.115 For a Soviet Russian pensioner who
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is practically incapable of working, this makes it very difficult to maintain a suitable lifestyle.
Also, many Soviet Russians lost their savings when countless banks defaulted in the 1990s.116
When people lose something they have worked so hard to earn or keep, it can take away their
hope. Additionally, “With breakdowns in the health-care system and widespread abuse of
alcohol, the average age at which men die has declined since the fall of Communism to 59.”117
The author’s questionnaire results do not verify that there is a drinking problem among Soviet
Russians. This lack of verification could be due to the low percentage of Soviet Russians who
answered the questionnaire and that most of them believed in a version of Christianity. Also, if
someone has a serious drinking problem, they are probably not trying to seriously improve their
level of English. Since most of the questionnaires were answered by those involved in a group to
practice their English, it is likely the questionnaire did not reach much into this demographic.
“Alcoholism, drug abuse, and suicide became widespread”118 as people became unemployed,
banks defaulted, savings were lost, and the price of alcohol dropped at the beginning of the
1990s. Alcohol caused more than 30 percent of the total deaths in Russia; this percentage was
much higher than in any European country at this time.119 Since post-Soviets were relatively
young at this time, it is more likely that the ones abusing alcohol were Soviet Russians. The
problem is further amplified by Soviet Russians regularly using alcohol to soothe themselves
after difficult days at work.120
The section on corruption showed that corruption led to hopelessness in the Soviet
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Russian worldview. It is common in present-day Russia that when talking to an older worker in a
store in St. Petersburg, the worker must almost be forced to do his or her job. William N. Harris,
a former missionary with InterAct Ministries in St. Petersburg, said that the common cashier will
give you the expression that says, “I’m living for the weekend, so don’t make me bite you.”121
Why would Soviet Russians want to work hard if they feel like it will mean nothing?
Additionally, as described in the section on corruption, the black market continues today in
Russia. The author has observed most imported jeans from America average over twice the
average American retail price when purchased in St. Petersburg. Furthermore, William Harris
observed, “One of the paradoxes of life in Russia is that while wages are on average ten times
less than American income, western products cost about thirty percent more.”122 Again, it seems
almost impossible for Soviet Russians to make it.
How can foreign missionaries in the present day reach out to Soviet Russians with their
worldview of hopelessness? Perhaps one thing the foreign missionary could do is give aid
without expecting anything in return. One of the huge critiques made by the Russian Orthodox
Church and, thus, Soviet Russians, in general, is that acts of charity by foreign missionaries are
“illegitimate material inducements.”123 Thus, it is advised that any “humanitarian aid…should be
given without coercion to convert to any religious confession.”124 This will help the Soviet
Russians gain some hope without feeling like there is some sort of trick behind the aid.
Additionally, the foreign missionary can help with the alcohol and drug problems by creating a
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ministry to help those that struggle with alcohol and drug abuse. The state and Russian Orthodox
Church already are trying to solve these issues,125 and it would gain their respect if foreign
missionaries joined this effort. The foreign missionary should help with alcohol and drug
problems and give without expecting anything in return. The missionary could remind Soviet
Russians that, “For those who love God all things work together for good, for those who are
called according to his purpose.”126 Also, he could teach and encourage them to keep being
honest in their efforts by sharing with them that, “The integrity of the upright guides them, but
the crookedness of treacherous destroys them.”127
“It has been said that excavating the Russian soul is like peeling an onion: the more you
penetrate its layers, the more you cry. In the end, you are left with empty nothingness.”128
Therefore, the missionary should take extra time and effort to peel those layers in getting to
know each of the Soviet Russians personally whom they are hoping to reach for Christ. It may
not be an easy, quick process, but, in the end, the Soviet Russians may realize that they have an
empty nothingness inside, which opens up a conversation where the foreign missionary can tell
them how to fill that empty nothingness with Christ. Paul wrote to the Romans, “May the God of
hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, so that by the power of the Holy Spirit you may
abound in hope.”129 The author’s research in Figure 9 showed that there was a larger percentage
of Russian Orthodox Soviets who were less hopeful that good would triumph over evil in the end
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when compared to Russian Orthodox post-Soviets. Thus, even though the Soviet Russians may
appear religious, hopelessness is still a problematic aspect of the Soviet Russian worldview that
the foreign missionary must address in his ministry efforts.

Figure 9. Comparison of Hopefulness Among Those That Claim Russian Orthodoxy

Lack of Trust
Hilarion Alfeyev, the head of external relations for the Moscow Patriarchate of the
Russian Orthodox Church, said, “Whoever comes with missionary purposes to our country must
first learn our history, our tradition, and see how to correlate with the existing Christian
churches.”130 When a foreign missionary takes time to learn the history and traditions of Soviet
Russians and learns to work with existing Christian churches, he is showing Soviet Russians that

130. Timothy C. Morgan, “From Russia, With Love: Orthodox Metropolitan Hilarion Offers Evangelicals
More Than an Olive Branch,” Christianity Today, May 5, 2011, 40.

44
he cares for them and is interested in them on a deeper basis than just converting them. This
effort can help the foreign missionary to break down trust barriers in his ministry to Soviet
Russians.
Another one of the crucial issues that the foreign missionary must overcome to gain trust
is to reach out to families as a whole. In 1993, Aleksii II, the former Moscow Patriarchate,
expressed resentment toward mission groups mainly from the West that he viewed as “simply
dangerous to the Russian people and to social order – by breaking up families.”131 The foreign
missionary needs to serve whole families and be focused on whole families in his efforts. In the
case where there is just one Protestant in a family, the missionary should encourage that person
to spend time with his or her family and love his or her family like God would love them.
Additionally, there is a problem in the present day in St. Petersburg with corrupt police.
The author has been asked, “What do you want me to do for you?” This is a question that is
asked when the police officer wants a bribe. From this point, a person may be brought into a
small booth on the street to pay a fine. At least this is what the police officer calls it. Since police
have the authority to pull over any car they want at random, there are no checks on corruption.
This type of corruption contributes to the lack of trust among Soviet Russians in St. Petersburg.
If the missionary would like to reach out past this worldview aspect, it is important to not bribe.
Because of the accusations of vote-rigging in Putin’s election,132 Soviet Russians do not
trust the government. However, interviewees I1 and I4 both considered Soviet Russians to be
more trusting in general than post-Soviet Russians. I1 claimed that this is because during Soviet
times many people did not even lock their doors. Additionally, before the Soviet Union collapsed
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there was one front door with one lock to an apartment. Now a majority of apartments in St.
Petersburg have two front doors that one must walk through upon entering an apartment with
locks on both of them. However, times have changed. Soviet Russians may have been like this at
one time, but they have learned and began taking proper precautions. I2 believed Soviet Russians
to be more trusting than post-Soviet Russians because she viewed them as having more open
conversation with others than she has noticed post-Soviet Russians having. Because of this trust,
it is possible that Soviet Russians are more likely to be taken advantage of. However, it is
possible that the open conversation could just be with people that the Soviet Russians already
know and not necessarily with strangers. It is wise to keep in mind that Russia does not fit into a
normal cultural expectation for the geographic location of its country. In general, the culture of
all Russians is uniquely hot-climate once one gets to know them but cold-climate if one does not
know them. This peculiarity is why Sarah A. Lanier noticed in the rural areas of Russia that the
people acted more hot-climate in their culture.133 It is much easier to get to know people in rural
areas where the smaller population is less overwhelming. I3 thought post-Soviet Russians are
more trusting and open because they have more energy, while I4 noticed no difference in general
between Soviet Russians and post-Soviet Russians regarding their capacity to trust others. Per
the questionnaire results, as seen earlier in Figure 3, Soviet Russians are slightly less trusting of
unknown people than post-Soviet Russians.
For the foreign missionary to make a connection with the lack-of-trust aspect of the
Soviet Russian worldview, it would be wise to analyze one’s own standard of living. Since
Soviet Russians feel that the rich are corrupt, it would be unwise to live at a rich standard of
living while reaching out to the Soviet Russian population in general. Since Westerners are the
133. Foreign to Familiar: A Guide to Understanding Hot- and Cold-Climate Cultures, Kindle ed.
(Hagerstown, MD: McDougal Publishing, 2000), 178-81.

46
predominant missionary group in Russia, their salaries are typically much higher than the
average Russian salary. Things like having a living room and one or more rooms just for children
are not basic expectations among the average Russian family in Russia. In Soviet times, many
times a family shared an apartment with one room, the living room/bedroom. In present times,
most Russians spend all their time with guests in their tiny kitchens. They do not usually have
living rooms for such occasions. When a foreign missionary invites a typical Russian guest over
for dinner and they see multiple rooms for one family, an unintentional message can be sent that
they are rich and, therefore, corrupt. The foreign missionary needs to be sure to address this
living situation when he has Soviet Russians visiting him by being open with them. At the same
time, if the foreign missionary were to live by average Russian standards, especially one from
America, it could raise suspicions from Russian visitors of something else; perhaps he is a spy.
Russians expect that foreigners, especially those from America, have higher incomes than the
average Russian; so they do expect the standard of living to be higher than average. The
American foreign missionary should find a balance in his living standards somewhere in the
middle to upper-middle class. If the foreign missionary’s home is in a new complex, which
mainly consists of Russians, which are driving only new, luxury automobiles, this should be an
indicator that he has found a place that would raise suspicions of corruption. However, if the
foreign missionary has found a place in an average neighborhood, but the remodeling is new and
he has an extra bedroom or two than average, then it probably is a suitable place.

Submissiveness
Communism directly contributed to the submissive aspect of the worldview of Soviet
Russians. Now Russia claims to be a democracy, but Soviet Russians are still affected by the
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communism they experienced. “It’s the first thing international visitors notice: The streets are
filled with nervous, blank faces. In public, many Russians don’t seem to acknowledge that other
humans are sharing their space.... They avoid eye contact.”134 Furthermore, an unspoken rule on
the Metro in St. Petersburg is that passengers are expected not to be loud while on the train,135
which leaves it eerily silent despite the massive hordes of people. As seen in the communism
section of this thesis, life in Soviet times was unsafe. This situation was especially true when one
was in public. “If you accidentally spoke to a stranger who was under suspicion from the
government, or told a joke about Stalin, or appeared too friendly with a foreigner, it could mean
interrogation or in extreme cases worse – a journey to a Siberian prison camp.”136 In general, it is
for this reason that Soviet Russians appear unfriendly and avoidant while in public. They have
developed this coldness as a defense mechanism.137 So in the present day, Soviet Russians by
nature submit to societal norms.
Additionally, the Russian Orthodox Church’s submission to Soviet authorities carries
over into present day as they still submit to governing authorities for the good of the whole.138
Since Russians tend to take the Russian Orthodox Church’s position on things, this leads them to
be more submissive to governing authorities. Moreover, since a higher percentage of Soviet
Russians claim Russian Orthodoxy, as already seen in Figure 8, this helps to support that Soviet
Russians are, in general, more submissive to governing authorities than post-Soviet Russians.
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Pyotr Chaadaev, a religious thinker in the 1800s in Russia, wrote a series of Philosophical
Letters.139 Regarding Russia’s future, he added: “Speaking of Russia, people always imagine that
they are speaking of a country that is like the others. In fact, it is not so at all. Russia is a whole
separate world, submissive to the will, caprice, fantasy of one man— no matter whether he be
called Peter or Ivan.”140 Today, one could consider Russian President Vladimir Putin to be this
man with his outlandish 70 to 75 percent positive approval rating.141 Thus, Soviet Russians seem
to submit to him automatically.
So how should a missionary use the understanding of submissiveness within his ministry
to those with a Soviet Russian worldview? As a foreign missionary in Russia, it is imperative
that when teaching the missionary reduces his position to the level of those he is teaching when
he asks them for input during a lesson. Although perhaps strange, especially to Soviet Russians,
this inquiry shows that the missionary is not some sort of unrelatable authority. As addressed in
the communism section, there is a submissiveness that is a part of a Soviet Russian’s worldview;
in general, he or she just accepts what is told to him or her from higher positions, like in the
example given of the submissive student to teacher situation. They are in fact all students
together, striving to follow God’s will, and they can all benefit from one another and build up
one another, as they should be doing.142 Additionally, the foreign missionary should also be
submissive, in general, to the government. Submissiveness is a biblical concept.143 Foreign
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missionary submission to the government will help the Soviet Russians feel like they can follow
and trust the foreign missionary.

Prejudice
All of the interviewees revealed that Soviet Russians liked and trusted foreigners less
than Russians in general. The questionnaire results substantiate this fact among Soviet Russians
in St. Petersburg. Soviet Union propaganda led toward prejudice being a prevalent aspect of
Soviet Russian worldview. Not long before the interview, I1 had overheard a Soviet Russian
grandmother on the street wondering how her grandson could learn among such conditions with
so many immigrant children from Central Asia in his classes at school. In 2014, the author had a
nanny that worked for him from Central Asia, and one day he saw her running away from his
apartment. She told him later that she did this because she was afraid of people who would abuse
her. She said it was not safe for people from Central Asia in St. Petersburg, especially at
nighttime. Not long after the end of the USSR, the racism of Soviet Russians was truly seen as
“Migration processes…upset the traditional ethnic and social balance in a number of regions,
leading to outbursts of racism and a soaring crime rate.”144 This racism came from regions being
overrun with immigrants, and Soviet Russians, including interviewee I1, did not like this. To
handle this, the foreign missionary should reach out to people of all nationalities in St.
Petersburg. This act shows the different nationalities of people, perhaps even including Soviet
Russians from different parts of Russia that those in St. Petersburg tend to be prejudiced toward,
that the missionary is accepting of them and cares for them.
Soviet Russians are not just prejudiced toward races and nationalities but also gender,
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specifically Soviet Russian men toward women. In the 1990s in the midst of extremely difficult
economic times, “Many women [were] eased out of good jobs and replaced by men.”145 It would
be difficult for the foreign missionary in St. Petersburg to be a woman at the present time and
reach Soviet Russians, especially men. Thus, it would be wise for a woman foreign missionary to
be a part of a team to reach out to prejudiced Soviet Russians; otherwise, she may not even be
given the opportunity by the Soviet Russian men.
Additionally, Soviet Russians are, in general, prejudiced toward religious minorities.146
The federal law, known as the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, which was
passed in 1997, contributed to Soviet Russian prejudice by creating accepted religions in Russia,
which are Orthodoxy, Buddhism, Judaism, and Islam.147 All Protestant denominations are
considered a religious minority and are marginalized. Thus, the foreign missionary must break
this prejudice over time by building trust and new relationships with people.
There is also a prejudice toward lower classes based on one’s position, as described in the
section on communism. For the foreign missionary, this prejudice is imperative to understand in
the present day. The author has personally observed a Russian preacher in a Baptist church
demand that the members of the church go get him coffee after service. When the author
questioned a veteran European missionary in St. Petersburg about this pastor’s power,148 she said
several church plants have failed because of a Russian getting in the position of pastor and
abusing his power over the congregation. However, Paul wrote to Peter, “Shepherd the flock of
God that is among you…not domineering over those in your charge, but being examples to the
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flock.”149 The foreign missionary should, thus, teach this to any Soviet Russian that he is training
to become a pastor, and the foreign missionary should strive to do what he teaches others to do.
In conclusion, the foreign missionary should implement the prejudice aspect of the Soviet
Russian worldview into his ministry efforts. He should teach that “all are one in Christ Jesus”
regardless of nationality, race, social position, or gender.150

Russian Orthodoxy
Among many Russians, “Russian Orthodoxy is seen as a cultural as well as a religious
institution, and it serves as a link to a pre-Soviet heritage.”151 This religion has survived to the
present day.
Many Russians today consider themselves Orthodox Christians, but do not necessarily
practice the religion. The concept of Russia as an Orthodox country is so deeply
imbedded that it seems natural to a Russian to be Orthodox. The very word Orthodox
means “right belief.” To profess Orthodoxy means reconnecting with the past,
recapturing aspects of Russian culture that were almost wiped out by the communists.152
Thus, we can conclude that “Russian culture is essentially Orthodox in character. The way in
which Russians think and make sense of their lives is deeply rooted in a Christian worldview,
whether they are aware of it or not.”153 Since a significantly larger percentage of Soviet Russians
in St. Petersburg claim Russian Orthodoxy as their religion over post-Soviet Russians, as already
observed in Figure 1 and Figure 8, it shows that Russian Orthodoxy is much more prevalent
among Soviet Russian worldview than post-Soviet. Although slightly less than half of them
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consider themselves practicing, this is still significantly more than the percentage of proclaimed
practicing Orthodox post-Soviet Russians, as seen in Figure 10. According to another study,
“Fewer than 5 percent of Russian Orthodox regularly attend church, and even fewer observe
basic church practices, such as the Great Fast (Lent).”154 So Russian Orthodoxy for Soviet
Russians is more about identity than actually following the religion.

Figure 10. Comparison of Dedication to Spiritual Beliefs Among Those That Profess Russian Orthodoxy

Despite having almost been wiped out during Soviet times, the Russian Orthodox Church
has rebuilt many of its churches today. In fact, Kirill’s strategy is “in-churching,” which involves
“seeing all segments of Russian society” as the Russian Orthodox Church’s mission field.155 In
doing this, the Russian Orthodox Church is rebuilding and building new church buildings,
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specifically in Moscow and St. Petersburg. However, there is a stronger desire for a better
European standard of living in these two cities than in other parts of Russia. The Russian
Orthodox Church has a theology of suffering, which does not relate well to the urban Russians
who desire an easier life.156 Suffering is something that seems to be ingrained into worldview of
Soviet Russians, perhaps from the Russian Orthodox Church. Even Fyodor Dostoevsky, a
famous Russian writer that is still often quoted in the present day by Russians in St. Petersburg,
wrote about suffering in his famous novel Crime and Punishment. He wrote, “Pain and suffering
are always inevitable for a large intelligence and a deep heart. The really great men must, I think,
have great sadness on earth.”157 Thus, Russian leaders use this type of mentality when speaking
to the general public to persuade them to persevere. A Soviet Russian dairy farmer recently had a
positive outlook after the recent economic sanctions and crisis in Russia and said, “We Russians
have survived crises worse than this. And anyway it's all temporary. Sooner or later we'll have
money again and foreign investment will return. And meantime while sanctions continue, the
stronger we will become."158 Additionally, the Russians have a proverb: Жизнь прожить — не
поле перейти. This proverb translates as “living life is not like crossing a field.” The meaning is
that life is not easy. The takeaway from these thoughts is that suffering makes Soviet Russians
stronger and better in the end. Furthermore, since Russian Orthodoxy represents the historical
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national pride of Russians,159 it is an additional component of the prejudice worldview aspect
among Soviet Russians.

Theological Differences
It may be tempting to think because of the apparent similarities, like “the ornate ritual of
the services of worship, with prescribed liturgies, the use of incense,”160 etc., in addition to the
large percentage of confessors versus doers of Orthodoxy, that it is like Catholicism. However,
there are several important differences. One of these important differences is that there is a
hierarchy within the Russian Orthodox Church unlike in the Catholic Church. The Patriarch,
currently Kirill, is at the head of the church in Moscow and all of Russia.
Additionally, there are some differences in thinking between the Russian Orthodox
Church and Protestants and Catholics. First off, Protestants from the West approach a person
standing before God as a legal matter, like before a judge. However, Russian Orthodoxy does not
view this situation in a legal sense.161 Secondly, Russian Orthodoxy’s “approach to the truth
claims of doctrine and to doctrine's place within the church is substantially different from the
approaches of Western Christians.”162 The key difference lies in theosis, which “does not mean
that humans become God, but with the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, in the economy of
salvation, there is a unique ontological union and transformation of the creature into God,
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although there is not a fusion of essence.”163 Vladimir Lossky, an influential Orthodox Christian
theologian, revealed that as opposed to Western Christianity, Eastern Orthodoxy “makes no
sharp distinction between theology and mysticism, between the realm of the common faith and
that of personal experience.”164

Addressing Proselytism
A problem that the missionary will face when reaching out to Soviet Russians who are
predominately Orthodox is that, “The Orthodox often regard Russians who have become
Protestant or Catholic as having abandoned something essential about their ethnic identity.”165
Thus, perhaps the foreign missionary should approach his ministry in St. Petersburg without a
focus on denominational labeling, but rather just focusing on the Bible and what the Bible
teaches. The missionary can still evangelize, teach the principles in the Bible, and make disciples
by focusing on what the Bible reveals. He can teach the people to study the Bible for themselves,
which is what those who consider themselves to be Russian Orthodox think they cannot do
without a priest to explain it to them. True personal Bible study does not happen apart from the
accepted, historical way of teaching a particular doctrine or Scripture among the Russian
Orthodox Church. Thus, instead of questioning and tweaking beliefs, the mindset over the
centuries in Eastern Orthodoxy “has been marked with a consistent attitude toward Christian
doctrine.”166 The idea that one individual cannot study the Bible by himself and make up his own

163. Daniel Haynes, “The Metaphysics of Christian Ethics: Radical Orthodoxy and Theosis,” Heythrop
Journal,” 52, no. 4 (2011): 659.
164. The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, Kindle ed. (Cambridge, UK: James Clarke & Co.,
1957), 146-7.
165. Burgess, "Christ and Culture Revisited: Contributions from the Recent Russian Orthodox Debate," 60.
166. Payton Jr., 57.

56
mind is not true. “All Scripture is breathed out by God and profitable for teaching, for reproof,
for correction, and for training in righteousness, that the man of God may be complete, equipped
for every good work.”167 So any person of God should be trained and equipped for good works
from the study of Scripture.
Doctrinally, the Russian Orthodox Church is not in line with the Bible on multiple issues,
such as salvation. So, it is acceptable for the foreign missionary to come to Russia, evangelize,
and makes disciples, but this must be done with care.
According to the Russian Orthodox Church, most of the population of Russia is under its
spiritual protection because they, or at least their parents, were baptized in this Church.
Therefore, Russia cannot be defined as an open field for the missionary work of
Evangelical denominations, as based on the words of Apostle Paul: “It has always been
my ambition to preach the gospel where Christ was not known, so that I would not build
on someone else's foundation” (Rom. 15:20). Thus, what was legitimate missionary work
in the mind of Evangelicals turned to be a nonlegitimate proselytism in the eyes of the
Russian Orthodox Church.168
The problem with this idea is that the foundation the Russian Orthodox Church is built on is not
biblical. Jesus Christ is not known among the Russian Orthodox Church as providing the
immediate link to the Heavenly Father through belief in Him. “To receive the [Russian
Orthodox] Church's care is also to receive its invitation to participate in the liturgical and
sacramental life of the Church in order to receive new life in Jesus Christ.”169 There is a problem
when new life in Jesus is dependent on participation in the liturgical and sacramental life of the
Russian Orthodox Church. It is known that whoever believes in Jesus will not perish but have
eternal life.170 Additionally, when one believes in Christ, he is sealed with the Holy Spirit,171 and
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God desires to work out the saved person’s salvation from this point.172 The saved person can
know they are saved because they can know that God abides in him or her.173 This is contrary to
the response of a leading Orthodox spokesman, who answered the question, “Are you saved?” in
this manner: “I trust that by God's mercy and grace I am being saved.”174 From an Orthodox
point of view, salvation is a process that starts at birth. However, this creates inconsistencies with
several passages in the Bible. If someone is being saved, how can they ever know if they are
saved or not? It is clear that someone is saved and receives eternal life at the moment he or she
believes in Jesus Christ because, at this point, this person is born again spiritually.175 It is
important for the foreign missionary to love the Russian Orthodox believers, appreciate their
traditions, and to try to understand what they believe.176 Not everything is wrong. Some of their
beliefs are just different. However, the core foundation of salvation is in error.
From the questionnaire results, there is much diversity of belief among those Soviet
Russians who confess Orthodoxy. For instance, as observed in Figure 11, about one-third of
Soviet Russians in St. Petersburg who confess Orthodoxy believe that prostitution is acceptable,
about one-fourth of them consider themselves unsubmissive to the government, more than half of
them believe all religions lead to God, almost half of them believe in astrology, about one-fifth
of them believe in reincarnation, only just over half of them believe in heaven and hell, about
one-third of them do not strongly believe God created the world, and almost one-third of them do
171. Eph. 1:13.
172. Phil. 2:12-13.
173. 1 John 4:13.
174. Payton Jr., 133.
175. See John 3:3; John 3:16.
176. Payton Jr., 14.
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not believe that in the end good will triumph over evil. Despite all of this discrepancy from
biblical truth, only one-third of them think it is likely that they would change their spiritual
beliefs.

Figure 11. Russian Orthodox Soviet Russians’ Selective Questionnaire Results

Even though there are serious doctrinal issues in the Russian Orthodox Church, the goal
of the foreign missionary should not be proselytism. The head of external relations for the
Moscow Patriarch said regarding proselytism,
Mission, for example, is when you go to a foreign country where Christianity was not
preached and you preach Christ. But when you come to a country where there is an
established church that has existed for centuries, then you have to respect it. Ideally you
have to come into contact with her and work together with her. Such work brings very
positive fruits.177
Therefore, the foreign missionary should make acquaintance with the Russian Orthodox Church
177. Morgan, 40.
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and try to work with her to a limited extent. The problem is that many times this does not work
out so well. The head of external relations for the Moscow Patriarch also said, “The activity of
foreign missionaries in Russia might be profitable to people, because there are many social
problems,”178 like those that result from secularism and include family and marital problems.
However, there is much contradiction within the Russian Orthodox Church leaders. For instance,
“Recent Pew Foundation survey research indicates Russia is more heavily secularized than even
Germany, Italy, or Canada. Nevertheless, Orthodox still regard Evangelical witness to even
nonbelieving Russians to be proselytizing.”179 Additionally, an American Methodist minister
tried to work with an Orthodox priest in the Ural region of Russia with humanitarian aid projects
and with repairs to an Orthodox Church. This collaboration was short lived after the Orthodox
priest was sent away to the Russian Far East after the both churches met together for worship in
an informal setting.180 Consider also that a Protestant missionary educator described
the interface of Orthodox and Evangelicals in Russia as haves/have-nots. We were all
have-nots ten years ago, but now the Orthodox Church is part of the establishment.
Russian culture presupposes an autocracy, and Orthodoxy is once again a part of the
establishment’s autocracy. All other religions are a threat to its monopoly position.
Questions of commonality of doctrine, faith, or mission are irrelevant.181
It seems no matter how hard Protestants try, the Orthodox believers they try to work with start
avoiding them after a while. Or even worse, they lash out at them. “Orthodox regularly employ
local press, radio, and television to denigrate non-Orthodox faiths.”182 For instance, the author
had one experience with a young college student who was searching to determine what type of
178. Ibid.
179. Elliott, "Orthodox-Protestant Relations in the Post-Soviet Era," 36.
180. Ibid., 40.
181. Ibid., 45.
182. Ibid., 40.
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faith was correct. She would come to the English outreach events the author led and regularly
asked questions about the Bible. One day she decided to go to an English international church
with the author. The girl saw some members of a Methodist/Pentecostal church there that she had
an encounter with, and it brought out some idea of a sect in her mind. From that point on she
avoided him. The author had some interaction with this girl afterwards, but not much seemed to
change. One day much later the author wrote to her something Paul wrote: “But this I confess to
you, that according to the Way, which they call a sect, I worship the God of our fathers,
believing everything laid down by the Law and written in the Prophets.”183 There was no
response to this message from the girl, but a few months after this instance the author was
visiting a bilingual international church and saw the girl there. She came up to him and was
happy to see him. She said that she had been saved and baptized in the last couple of weeks. She
admitted that she was wrong about Protestant groups and that she had believed what she had
been told by the Russian Orthodox Church about groups like the one the author was a part of.
She had been told that Baptists were a sect. Thankfully, this young woman was still reached for
Christ, but the process took much longer and was much more complicated because of the
Orthodox media propaganda. Likewise, a current veteran American foreign missionary has
experienced resistance to acceptance to tracts on the street due to Orthodox media propaganda
regarding Baptists and evangelism.184

183. Acts 24:14.
184. American Baptist missionary.
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Advice To Foreign Missionaries
Despite these difficulties, the foreign missionary should still strive to take some various
steps when ministering in Russia, which Russia views as Russian Orthodox territory. First off,
the foreign missionary should make an attempt to introduce himself to local Orthodox priests to
possibly help ease any suspicions. Secondly, in order to help earn the respect of the Russian
Orthodox Church and especially Soviet Russians, it would be wise for the missionary to educate
himself about the Russian Orthodox Church. Thirdly, it is not wise to debate the Russian
Orthodox Church publicly or privately. Especially, do not preach negatively about it.185 While
the Russian Orthodox Church has some errors as a whole doctrinally, there may still be some
true believers among her. Plus, only God and the person know if the person is saved or not. It is
not up to others to be the judge of true belief. Additionally, the foreign missionary should
remember to balance the Golden Rule and the Great Commission, not just making disciples but
considering how one’s ministry would make the other denomination feel if there is no respect
involved.186 Still, “Today in Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church is free and favored by the
state,”187 and “Foreign religions, particularly from the West, are neither free nor welcome.”188
Thus, no matter what the foreign missionary does, he still may not be welcome. Since there are
so many post-Soviet Russians that are not Russian Orthodox, it may be best to focus ministry
efforts on them.
Figure 12 reveals something that should be very encouraging to the foreign missionary.
There were a higher percentage of those that raised Soviet Russians that claimed Russian
185. Elliott, "Orthodox-Protestant Relations in the Post-Soviet Era," 46.
186. Witte Jr. and Bourdeaux, 24.
187. Ibid., 19.
188. Ibid.
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Orthodoxy as their religion than the Soviet Russians. Additionally, there were a higher
percentage of those that raised post-Soviet Russians that claimed Russian Orthodoxy as their
religion than the post-Soviet Russians. The Russian Orthodox profession seems to be becoming
less and less popular with the younger generations.

Figure 12. Comparison of Identification with Russian Orthodoxy Among Generations

Summary
Since Soviet Russians have been reached out to freely by missionaries for more than two
decades already, many sources are available about Soviet Russians. The historical events that
clearly have influenced their current worldview are: the extinguishing of Christianity;
communism; corruption; and missions in the early 1990s. The result of these events in Soviet
Russian worldview is elements of hopelessness, a lack of trust, submissiveness, prejudice, and
identification with Russian Orthodoxy. The foreign missionary can learn from these elements of
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worldview to assist him in his ministry to Soviet Russians. In order to reach Soviet Russians,
who have a hopeless element in their worldview, the missionary should give aid without
expecting anything in return, teach them from the Bible about integrity, and live with integrity.
In order to minister to those who have a resistance to trust in their worldview, the foreign
missionary should take time to learn the history and traditions of the Soviet Russians, learn to
work with existing Christian churches, reach out to entire families, not bribe, and live modestly.
In order to reach those who have a submissive element to their worldview, the foreign
missionary should put himself as a teacher on the same level as those that he is teaching and
follow the laws. In order to minister to those who have a prejudice element to their worldview,
the missionary should reach out to people of all nationalities, not domineer over those he is
ministering to, and should teach that all are one despite race, social class, gender, and nationality.
In order to reach those who have a Russian Orthodox element to their worldview, the foreign
missionary should not focus on a denominational label but rather what the Bible teaches,
encourage them to read and study the Bible for themselves, and come in contact with and attempt
to work with the Russian Orthodox Church.
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Chapter 3
POST-SOVIET RUSSIANS

Comparison of History and Key Background Events of Soviet Russians
It is important to compare the differences in experiences and worldview between Soviet
Russians and post-Soviet Russians to understand the current lack of spiritual fruit in St.
Petersburg. The experiences of post-Soviet Russians are quite different than those of Soviet
Russians. These differences have led to the formation of contrasting elements of worldview in
post-Soviet Russians when compared to Soviet Russians. Since the background of post-Soviet
Russians is relatively short, the history and key background events of Soviet Russians will be
collated with those of post-Soviet Russians. The author will analyze how the lack of the
extinguishing of Christianity, no experience of communism, a different experience of corruption,
and a different perspective on missions in the 1990s affected the post-Soviet Russian worldview.

No Extinguishing of Christianity
In their childhood, post-Soviet Russians may have experienced some of the chaotic
events of the early 1990s. Additionally, there are some fairly restrictive laws on religion other
than Russian Orthodoxy, especially for foreign missionaries. However, these types of events do
not compare to the devastating events that led to almost the complete extinguishment of
Christianity in Soviet times. Thus, a post-Soviet Russian’s worldview will, in general, differ
from a Soviet Russian’s worldview.
“Religious belief is a poorly understood yet constituent component of post-Soviet identity
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construction.”189 Thus, it is necessary to consider how a plethora of religious options is affecting
post-Soviet Russians. Freedom of religion, in general, can give hope to post-Soviet Russians.
Even though their religious options are positive when considering that Soviet Russians did not
have such options,190 these vast options can still present a problem. One interviewee said that the
Soviet Russians who were religious are more faithful to their religion than post-Soviets because
post-Soviets’ faith has not been tested by persecution. According to the questionnaire results, her
opinion is true for those in St. Petersburg, as seen in Figure 13. Furthermore, as observed in
Figure 14, 33 percent of post-Soviet Russians claim Russian Orthodoxy, 22 percent claim
atheism, 13 percent claim Buddhism, an overinflated 7 percent claim Protestantism because of
connections to the author, 5 percent wrote in to claim agnosticism, 3 percent could not answer, 2
percent claim Judaism, 2 percent claim Islam, 2 percent wrote in some form of secular
humanism, and the other 11 percent wrote in other various religions and belief systems that made
up 1 percent or less of the of total. This 11 percent included but was not limited to Catholicism,
scientism, monism, omnism, Taoism, ietsism, Zen Buddhism, selfism, Gnosticism, pantheism,
and just believing in God with no religion.
It is obvious that among post-Soviet Russians there is a lot of confusion from all of the
different choices of religion. Russian President Vladimir Putin complicates this issue even more.
While at the same time saying that he supports religious freedom, he promotes “Russian
Orthodoxy as a harbinger of the Russian national idea and as a crucial element for unity in the
state.”191 Moreover, more and more Russians, especially post-Soviet younger generations are not

189. Knox, "Church, State, and Belief in Post-Soviet Russia," 122.
190. I1.
191. Beth M. Admiraal, “The Failure of National Religious Policy in the Post-Soviet Region: The
Experiences of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia and Greek Catholics in Romania,” Religion in Eastern
Europe 32, no. 1 (February 2012): 20.

66
choosing to be identified with Russian Orthodoxy.
Many Russians…will formally bow to Orthodoxy and even regard it as a special part of
Russian identity. But they will increasingly try on other, sometimes competing cultural
identities. The new Russia is a place in which not only Orthodoxy thrives, but also…a
multitude of religious, ideological and lifestyle subcultures…. Most Russians are
probably not on the way to claiming Orthodoxy as their primary identity.192
This new trend is showing the rebelliousness among post-Soviet Russians to present Soviet
Russian traditions.

Figure 13. Comparison of Dedication to Spiritual Beliefs

192. Burgess, “Orthodox Resurgence: Civil Religion in Russia,” 4.
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Figure 14. Comprehensive Comparison of Religious Identifications of Post-Soviet Russians

The many religious options have driven more post-Soviet Russians to atheism.193 The
questionnaire results show an increasing trend toward atheism and agnosticism among postSoviet Russians, as seen in Figure 15. This trend can cause morals to decrease as significantly
more post-Soviet Russian atheists and agnostics think that prostitution is acceptable; in fact,
more than half of them did when compared to all other religious identifications of post-Soviet
Russians as a whole, as seen in Figure 16. Thus, the foreign missionary should make an effort to
be up-front with atheists, love them, and show them the truth. Resources, such as those from
www.answersingenesis.com, can be useful to provide answers to the post-Soviet atheists and
agnostics that are looking for answers. 1 Corinthians 13:1-3 reveals the necessity of love over
any type of words one may say. So if the process of evangelizing an atheist becomes a heated

193. I2.
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argument, the foreign missionary may just sound like “a noisy gong or a clanging cymbal.”194 In
the English ministry that the author leads, it is made evident in the description of the VKontakte
group of the ministry that the leaders are Christians who speak native English and desire to do
this ministry free of charge in order to show the love of God to all who come. The ministry even
meets in a church facility. In this facility, various religious literature is clearly laid out, and
crosses are displayed on the walls. Additionally, during the discussion time there will be a part of
the conversation that turns to one’s own personal beliefs. During this time, the Christian
volunteers share Christ with the attendants. Nothing is hidden. Everything is out in the open. If
the ministry is to help Russians, primarily post-Soviet, to open up about their beliefs, then it is
vital for the foreign missionary to be open in all speech and action. Despite the religious reason
behind the ministry, atheists and agnostics still come regularly, some new and some reoccurring.
Perhaps this anomaly could be evidence in these atheists and agnostics of less of a dislike
of the Bible and more of a dislike of religion, like Russian Orthodoxy. When analyzing the
questionnaire results, almost 50 percent of post-Soviet-proclaimed atheists and agnostics have a
positive impression of the Bible, while only 14 percent have a positive impression of the Russian
Orthodox Church. Furthermore, only 15 percent have a completely negative impression of the
Bible, while almost 50 percent have a completely negative impression of the Russian Orthodox
Church, as observed in Figure 17. So it is important for the foreign missionary to realize that the
Bible is more important to emphasize when speaking to atheists and agnostics than religion. In
fact, it might be wise to dismiss any discussion at all about religion and keep it all about the
Bible. Additionally, there is hope for the foreign missionary to see true conversions take place in
a ministry to post-Soviet atheists and agnostics in St. Petersburg because almost 50 percent claim

194. 1 Cor. 13:1.
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it is likely that they could change their spiritual beliefs. This situation shows openness among
post-Soviet Russians to the Bible and to changing spiritual beliefs.

Figure 15. Trend of the Percentage of Post-Soviet Russians claiming Atheism/Agnosticism

Figure 16. Comparison of Post-Soviet Russian View of Prostitution Based on Religious Identification
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Figure 17. Atheist/Agnostic Post-Soviet Russian Impression of the Bible vs. the Russian Orthodox Church

No Experience of Communism
Communism continues to define the worldview of Soviet Russians in the present day;
however, for post-Soviet Russians there has been little to no experience of communism. As
communism disappeared and free markets came about in the early and mid-1990s, the working
Soviet Russians really struggled. Post-Soviet Russians, on the other hand, did not have
experience with this economic transformation that came because they were not of working age.
The oldest were ten years old when the Soviet Union collapsed and had not yet reached the
working age in the Russian culture.
However, some post-Soviet Russians were affected by this situation differently when
communism disappeared and free markets developed. In this time period after the fall of the
Soviet Union, “Social marginalization (e.g., the number of street children) reached levels
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unknown since the Civil War of 1917-1923.”195 Thus, the worldview of some post-Soviet
Russians, primarily the class with low-family incomes, could have been affected by this. Perhaps
it could have made these street children rebellious against the new systems. Unfortunately, this
cannot be verified by the questionnaire. Only 3 percent of post-Soviet Russians who answered
the questionnaire reported that they have a low-family income, as seen in Figure 18.

Figure 18. Household Income of Post-Soviet Russians in St. Petersburg

Because Soviet Russians experienced this change from communism to democracy, they
can view the economy as manipulation.196 However, post-Soviet Russians took a different stance
on what was happening, seeing that immorality would make them rich. This realization provided
hope to post-Soviet Russians, but hope in the wrong thing. An example of this hope in the wrong
195. Chaplin, 99.
196. Ibid.
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thing is provided in the next section on a different experience of corruption.
When Communism ended and the Soviet Union fell, Soviet Russians felt Russia
“experienced an enormous sense of loss – a loss of prestige, power, and influence abroad.”197
However, post-Soviet Russians do not really feel this connection to the Soviet Union because
they were too young or not yet born. Instead, they are open and hopeful toward what can come
because they have not experienced such loss in general.
In contrast to a lack of religious information available to Soviet Russians, post-Soviet
Russians are receiving much more information, often through media.198 This information makes
them more hopeful because they can double check any information they hear with other sources.
Additionally, the availability of social networks, which have a wealth of all types of information,
inspires them to be more open about their thoughts and actions.

A Different Experience of Corruption
In Soviet times the people knew less about the actual level of corruption, but in presentday Russia, Russians are very aware of modern-day corruption.199 From the same apartment
being sold to multiple different people at one time, to the police stopping someone for a
document check with the purpose of collecting a bribe, corruption is prevalent in St. Petersburg.
In contrast, during Soviet times corruption was at a higher level, but Soviet Russians knew about
it less.200 The presence of government universities and relationships that can help someone to get

197. Jonathan E. M. Clarke, "Orthodoxy and the Search for Identity in Contemporary Russia," Journal of
Religion & Society 13 (2011), http://moses.creighton.edu/JRS/2011/2011-18.pdf (accessed April 3, 2013),
5.
198. Davis, 73.
199. I1.
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things is what I2 gave as examples of current corruption. Even though she thought that
corruption is prevalent and people know about it and are fighting to change it, she thinks there is
no option to change it now but there will be in the future. This viewpoint shows a hope in her
post-Soviet worldview. It also shows rebelliousness in her in the future to change such
corruption.
I4 revealed a different viewpoint on corruption, saying that it is more prevalent now
because there are less moral principles among post-Soviet Russians, and the need for money is
higher now than in Soviet times when people did not have to worry about money as much.
However, data from the survey the author conducted shows otherwise regarding the statements
of morality by I4. When excluding Protestantism as the chosen answer for spiritual beliefs of the
respondents on the questionnaire, a higher percentage of Soviet Russians in St. Petersburg think
that prostitution is acceptable than post-Soviet Russians. This feedback is coming from a city in
which the streets are overrun with prostitution advertisements. Perhaps this is showing
rebelliousness in post-Soviet Russians against the corrupt Soviet Russians that are immoral and
support activities, such as prostitution. This situation is fairly surprising, but this could be due to
the corruption that took place in the 1990s affecting the post-Soviet Russians differently than the
Soviet Russians. For instance, “female unemployment [was] high, and prostitution [had]
therefore become a popular way for women to make money.”201 Furthermore, “Many teenage
girls [believed] that a career in prostitution [would] pay more than most legitimate professions
ever would, regardless of education. About one-fourth of Russia’s prostitutes [had] received
some sort of higher education.”202 So the terrible economic times prevalent in the 1990s, when

201. Gall, 339.
202. Ibid.
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Soviets and not post-Soviets needed work, led to an increase in prostitution and possibly an
increase in the acceptance of it. How can the foreign missionary reach out to such women who
have ended up stuck in such jobs? Perhaps the foreign missionary can reach out to help them find
different jobs if they would be willing to. There is the challenge in finding such women though.
Many prostitutes are addicted to some type of drug introduced by their pimp. One morning while
driving in St. Petersburg, the author and his wife saw a woman in her forties who was sitting in
the road just crying. It was obvious from her appearance that she was a prostitute. The author
asked if there was anything that he could do to help her. She just said she needed a cigarette and
was waiting on a bus. She would not say she needed any other help. It is important to realize that
ministry to prostitutes is needed but dangerous, as organized crime could be behind several
prostituting issues in the city.
Regarding the situation of corruption, which was amplified after the end of Communism,
here is an example of the strange hope this created among post-Soviet Russians. One time the
author was having a discussion during his English ministry with some college-aged post-Soviet
Russians. One of them wanted to be a health inspector. The author was curious if this was a
lucrative job because it seemed like a strange aspiration for a college student. The college student
said that officially health inspectors make very low salaries, but unofficially they can be rich
because they take bribes from businesses to pass the inspections. Additionally, consider these
results from the questionnaire. Out of the four options of what one thinks of a rich person,
according to Figure 19 the smallest percentage of post-Soviet Russians and Soviet Russians
chose that this person comes from a rich family. Post-Soviet Russians equally chose that the
person was smart and hard-working or none of the above. On the other hand, Soviet Russians
after choosing none of the above as the highest percentage answer, chose that the person was
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corrupt. Since St. Petersburg is one of the wealthier cities in Russia, it would be wise to see what
those that claimed a low- and below-average family income thought of a rich person. The results
do change in this situation, as observed in Figure 20. The one-third of Soviet Russians that
claimed this type of income thought equally that a very rich person is either corrupt or none of
the above. While the lowest percentage answer changed from being from a rich family to being
smart and hard-working. Among 17 percent of post-Soviet Russians that claimed this type of
income, the highest percentage answer became that the person was corrupt, followed by none of
the above, then smart and hard-working, and then from a rich family. So the perception of the
very rich changed significantly when looking at it from a lower income level. According to postSoviet Russians, corruption is the most common response to the reason for someone being rich.
Thus, the foreign missionary should be honest, transparent and avoid any form of corruption in
order to show that although he may have more money than the average Russian, he is not
corrupt. Also, it would be wise for the missionary to have a higher education to prove that he is
smart and a hard-worker who has money for a reason that does not include corruption or being
from a rich family. The missionary earning a higher education will earn respect among the postSoviet Russians, especially since they believe this to be the path to wealth and success.
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Figure 19. Comparison of the Impression of a Wealthy Person

Figure 20. Comparison of the Impression of a Wealthy Person from a Low-Income Perspective
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A Different Perspective of Missions in the Early 1990s
“Religiously speaking, the first half of 1990s can be titled ‘All are welcome.’”203
However, did post-Soviets feel this way? Yes, they had the option to be accepted among a new
different religion, but did they feel welcomed? On the other hand, were the foreign missionaries
welcomed? How does this different perspective affect the worldview of post-Soviet Russians in
the present day?
In her interview, I3, a post-Soviet Russian, was not aware of this event in history. I2, on
the other hand, was well aware of this point in history. She said in the town where she grew up,
Volkov, that there were a lot of Baptist churches that appeared but that they were mysterious.
Additionally, she said the townspeople were prejudiced against the Baptists and that post-Soviet
Russians did not care about the missionaries in this time period. Moreover, she felt that Soviet
Russians took aid from the missionaries but did not follow their religion. Even though I2 said
that the Baptists in her town were mysterious to her, this should not alarm foreign Baptist
missionaries. “For the overwhelming majority of the Russian population, Orthodoxy and
Christianity in general were considered the 'most mysterious mystery', concerning which they
had only a very vague idea.”204 So Baptists were not the only ones viewed as mysterious.
However, the foreign missionaries should be open and intentional about building relationships to
dispel any preconceived notions. It is difficult for foreign missionaries who are learning the
language to build relationships. The missionary must be willing to make mistakes and be willing
to learn. Usually, natives will deal with the foreign missionary, even if his language abilities are

203. Olga Filippova and Olga Kazmina, “Re-Imagination of Religion in Post-Soviet Society: Challenges
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not perfect. The missionary needs to make sure he is making the people feel welcome and
comfortable.
I4 said she feels hostility toward these missionaries. She felt that the foreign missionaries
in the early 1990s wanted to change her mind and culture and that this makes her feel abused.
However, after claiming the Russian Orthodox Church is like her family, she said she would
tolerate foreign missionaries if they did not try to change her mind. This declaration exhibited
rebelliousness in this post-Soviet Russian toward foreign missionary activities. The author felt
that this particular interviewee carried very strong ideals with her from her parents, as she
referenced them often. She took the bad feelings that her parents have toward foreign
missionaries and made them her own. Although this situation is possible among post-Soviet
Russians, it is more common for them to have different spiritual beliefs than their parents. Soviet
Russians have the same tendency, as seen in Figure 21. So the foreign missionary should not let
such people discourage him. He, instead, should just realize that he will not be welcomed in all
places by all people and just keep serving where God has called him.
Perhaps the flood of missionaries has led to an openness of various beliefs among postSoviet Russians, who did not fully experience the problematic missionary efforts of the 1990s. It
seems that this caused them to keep searching instead of retreating to something safe like
Russian Orthodoxy. For this section, those identified as Protestants are not included in order to
give a more accurate picture of post-Soviet vs. Soviet Russian beliefs. When also excluding
those that claim Orthodoxy, the majority of post-Soviet Russians, 44 percent, conceded the
existence of God or some supernatural power but are not convinced of it when asked if they
believe in God. In contrast, only 28 percent of Soviet Russians with the same criteria chose this
option. When Orthodox Russians were included in this percentage of post-Soviet Russians, this
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percentage dropped to 39 percent, but it was still the most chosen answer. In contrast, only 22
percent of Soviet Russians of the same criteria chose this. These statistics can all be observed in
Figure 22. Thus, it seems that a majority of post-Soviet Russians are at least open to the idea that
God may be real, and a significantly higher percentage of them are open to the idea that God
may be real, even though they are not convinced of his reality at the moment. Thus, there is hope
for the foreign missionary in seeing more true conversions to Christ among them.

Figure 21. Comparison of Spiritual Beliefs Between Respondents and Their Parents
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Figure 22. Comparison of Those Who Concede the Existence of God or Some Supernatural Power but Are Not
Convinced

Worldview of Post-Soviet Russians
From the analysis prior to this point in the paper, it seems that rebelliousness, openness,
and hope are three major aspects of the post-Soviet Russian worldview when in comparison to
the Soviet Russian worldview. In this section, each of these aspects of worldview will be
analyzed in the present day, and recommendations will be given for how the foreign missionary
can make use of these aspects of post-Soviet worldview in his ministry to post-Soviet Russians.

Rebelliousness
I1 shared that Soviet Russians were more submissive and less rebellious than post-Soviet
Russians. She thought this because post-Soviet Russians do not have much to lose in general;
whereas Soviet Russians have much more to lose: family, work, house, etc. I3 supported the
same thought that post-Soviet Russians are less submissive than Soviet Russians, but reasoned
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that submissiveness among Soviet Russians was more out of habit in Soviet times than anything
else. I2 likewise thought that Soviet Russians are more submissive than post-Soviet Russians,
and she said that now Soviet Russians do not care about changing anything with the government.
She believed they just accept it. However, post-Soviet Russians in general are less like this. With
this being said, she thinks the government may be creating some of the bomb scares in the city in
order to scare post-Soviets into submission and away from rebellion. I4 additionally agreed about
the more rebelliousness among post-Soviet Russians, and the reason she gave is that Soviet
Russians know what to expect from the government and submit to it.
A rebellion against Russian Orthodoxy was proved in the section which revealed no
experience of the extinguishing of Christianity among post-Soviet Russians. As fewer and fewer
post-Soviet Russians claim Russian Orthodoxy and have a positive impression of it, this is a
rebellion to the societal norm, since more Russians are moving toward Russian Orthodoxy.205 As
the missionary takes advantage of this rebellious nature within the post-Soviet worldview in
hopes of seeing more of them make true conversions to Christianity, the foreign missionary
should take care to verify that he is not breaking the new law passed on counteracting terrorism.
Since the Russian Orthodox Church is closely linked with the government and “[has] a constant
dialogue with the government in order to assist each other and people in their daily lives,”206 it is
possible that they could collaborate with the government in dealing with a foreign missionary
who is encouraging rebelliousness in post-Soviet Russian behavior toward the Russian Orthodox
Church. Forbidden missionary activity phrases in the new law, such as “conducting extremist
activity” or “coercion into destroying the family” can be easily twisted to make the foreign
205. N. Zorkaya, ed., “Russian Public Opinion 2012-2013” (Moscow, Russia: Levada Center, 2013),
http://www.levada.ru/old/books/obshchestvennoe-mnenie-2012-eng (accessed December 4, 2016), 145.
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missionary seem guilty.207 Thus, it is wise for the foreign missionary to stay out of the public
media spotlight, especially involving any sort of discrepancy from Russian Orthodoxy.
As revealed in the section on corruption, I2 explained the rebelliousness in her and
among post-Soviet Russians to eventually reduce corruption. Additionally, this corruption
section revealed a possible rebellious aspect in post-Soviet Russians’ worldview, as they
supported prostitution less than Soviet Russians, which is even more surprising considering
much fewer post-Soviet Russians claim to be religious per the questionnaire results. Post-Soviet
Russians may not be as hardened in their hearts as Soviet Russians, even those Soviet Russians
who identify with Russian Orthodoxy. Additionally, these results may mean fewer post-Soviet
Russians are putting their identity into a religion that they do not truly believe in. Thus, the
missionary should believe that there is the potential for much more spiritual fruit over time. As
was discovered through the many errors made by foreign missionaries in the early 1990s,
conversion among Russians “did not follow the pattern of quick conversion expected by the
Westerners” but, instead, was gradual.208 Thus, the foreign missionary should not rush any
conversions or get discouraged if spiritual fruit is coming much slower than originally
anticipated.
However, before the foreign missionary gets too optimistic, he should consider what I4
said in the section about missions in the early 1990s. I4 revealed that she had hostility toward
foreign missionaries who desired to change her mind. Since she claims Russian Orthodoxy, this
is the kind of situation that discourages missionaries and keeps them from committing and

207. “Russian Federation Federal Law: Concerning Changes into the Federal Law ‘Counteracting
Terrorism’ and Individual Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding Establishment of
Additional Measures to Counteract Terrorism and the Provision of Social Safety.”
208. Glanzer, 319.
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staying in St. Petersburg. However, this girl is new to St. Petersburg, still very young, and has a
long time to change her mind. Thus, the foreign missionary should not let this discourage him in
his ministry efforts, and he should strive to put in the time necessary to change such rightly
justified apprehension about foreign missionaries in Russia. Additionally, the missionary should
be cautious as to not try to force a conversion, since this is not biblical and would drive the
potential convert even further away.

Openness
There is an openness among atheist and agnostic post-Soviet Russians toward discussion
about the Bible and changing spiritual beliefs when compared to that of Soviet Russians. The
foreign missionary should take advantage of this openness and strive to have open discussions
about the Bible. However, this can be tricky for the new missionary, considering the restriction
of the new law as any missionary activity like a Bible study should be carried out “in the
buildings and structures belonging to the religious organizations” and not “in residential
buildings.”209 Thus, having an open discussion about the Bible with a nonbeliever within the
foreign missionary’s home is not technically legal. In fact, in Russia a person needs government
approval just to evangelize outside church property. If not, the organization or foreign
missionary can face problems, like those that established Baptist congregations recently faced.210
Additionally, a believer of a Protestant church was fined for handing out copies of the New

209. “Russian Federation Federal Law: Concerning Changes into the Federal Law ‘Counteracting
Terrorism’ and Individual Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding Establishment of
Additional Measures to Counteract Terrorism and the Provision of Social Safety.”
210. Roman Lunkin, “Antievangelism Law Used Against Long Established Baptist Congregations,” Paul.
D. Stevens, http://www2.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/161202a.html (accessed December 12, 2016).
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Testament and Psalms on a train.211 Even just putting up advertisements for Bible meetings can
be problematic, as one foreign missionary from America found out.212
Also, post-Soviet Russians are more open to change than Soviet Russians. The reason for
this difference is because they have not experienced a loss like the Soviet Russians did when the
communist government system fell along with the Soviet Union. The foreign missionary can use
this aspect of post-Soviet worldview in his ministry to them by introducing them to life as a part
of a church. This new life is probably foreign to them, even if they are familiar with the Russian
Orthodox Church. God loves the church,213 and it is necessary for believers to be a part of a
church, which acts as the body of Christ.214 The foreign missionary could personally invite the
post-Soviet Russian to study the Bible with him, invite him to a church service, or invite him to
some other church activity. As long as this invitation is done privately and not out in the open,
the foreign missionary should be fine regarding the new law’s restrictions.
Post-Soviet Russians are, in general, more open in their thoughts and actions than Soviet
Russians. This frankness can be observed on social networks, where younger Russians tend to
share more personal information than Soviet Russians. The foreign missionary could use this
aspect of the post-Soviet worldview in ministry by creating a time for the post-Soviet Russians to
share their thoughts. For instance, the author’s English ministry includes a discussion time with
spiritual topics. As they become more open, the foreign missionary can provide more and more
information from the Bible and his personal relationship with Christ. Moreover, sharing a
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personal testimony to post-Soviet Russians is very interesting to them and encourages them to
also be open.

Hope
Freedom of religion, in general, has contributed to the hope aspect of the post-Soviet
Russian worldview. Despite the new law restrictions on missionary activity, there is freedom of
religion when compared to lack of freedom of religion in Soviet times. So the foreign missionary
can be thankful for the opportunity that he has to still reach out to post-Soviet Russians, even if it
must be done in a certain manner to be legal. He should quickly and diligently reach out to as
many post-Soviet Russians as possible before any more restrictions take place on religion and
their hopefulness slowly fades away.
Post-Soviet Russians were also shown to have a hope for the future, especially one
involving less corruption. Even though just slightly more post-Soviet Russians have hope that
good will in the end triumph over evil, this discrepancy was much more evident when looking at
atheists/agnostics and those who claimed Russian Orthodoxy as seen in previous sections of the
thesis. Since this survey question depended a lot on interpretation by the respondent, i.e. via
atheistic interpretation, the foreign missionary would be wise to implement this aspect of
worldview into his ministry. He could explain that Christians have their hope in Christ for
salvation and in his second coming to restore everything.215 This future is one that will be
without corruption. The future that unbelieving post-Soviet Russians may hope for involves hope
and trust in men, which is a hope and trust that Christians should not have.216 Instead they should

215. Acts 3:19-21.
216. Ps. 146:3.
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have a hope in Christ, in whom there is salvation.
As revealed earlier in this thesis, post-Soviet Russians have an availability of information
that Soviet Russians did not have during communist times. Thus, this makes them more hopeful
because they can determine what is happening for themselves and not just trust someone else for
correct information. The foreign missionary should challenge the post-Soviet Russians to
“examine intellectually the claim that Jesus Christ is God’s Son,” as Josh McDowell did before
becoming a believer in Jesus. 217 When one does this he will find “overwhelming evidence…that
Jesus Christ was God’s Son.”218 The Apostle Paul said to the church of the Thessalonians to “test
everything; hold fast what is good.”219 Thus, the foreign missionary should challenge the open
post-Soviet Russians to use the wide availability of information to do this. While staying in touch
with them over time, the foreign missionary will see more fruit come from his ministry to
nonbelieving post-Soviet Russians.
Finally, it was seen earlier in this thesis that there is an apparent hope in wealth and
success, which many post-Soviet Russians believe is reached via corruption. This anomaly seems
to contradict the rebelliousness some of them have toward corruption, but it can be explained by
the differing belief systems among post-Soviet Russians. The foreign missionary, in addition to
avoiding any form of corruption, should emphasize that true success comes from the Lord.220

217. The New Evidence That Demands a Verdict, 3rd ed. (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Publishers,
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Summary
It is absolutely necessary for the foreign missionary in St. Petersburg to be aware of and
continue to be mindful of post-Soviet Russians’ worldviews. Post-Soviet Russians are the next
leaders of Russia, and the foreign missionary should strive to reach them now. They are
significantly different in their worldview because their experiences include: a lack of
extinguishing of Christianity; no experience of communism; a different experience of corruption;
and a different experience of missions in the early 1990s. The worldview elements of
rebelliousness, openness, and hope should be applied in ministry efforts to reach post-Soviet
Russians. To minister to post-Soviet Russians, who have a rebellious element in their worldview,
the foreign missionary should stay out of the public media spotlight and give significant time for
post-Soviet Russians to accept Christ, being careful not to force a false conversion. In applying
the openness element of their worldview, the foreign missionary should have an open Bible
study with them and invite them privately to church services. In applying the hopeful element of
their worldview, the missionary should explain that Christians put their hope in Christ, who is
perfect, as opposed to imperfect men, encourage research of the Bible, and teach that true
success comes from the Lord.
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Chapter 4
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND REFLECTIONS

The need for such a study on the worldview of Soviet Russians vs. post-Soviet Russians
greatly influenced the author to discover what was missing in ministry efforts in St. Petersburg.
The author had heard from a veteran missionary with The Navigators that church planting in St.
Petersburg cannot be done.221 He had heard from seminary professors that Russia was not a place
that missionaries should go to in the present day because of its lack of spiritual fruit. However,
all people matter because God desires for all to be saved.222 God calls Christians to different
places to reach different people.223 Therefore, missionaries in St. Petersburg should continue to
minister where they are called in their work of reconciliation between people and God. Situations
such as lack of spiritual fruit should not discourage the missionary, as this is very prevalent in St.
Petersburg. Instead, the missionary should focus on “whatever is true, whatever is honorable,
whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is commendable, if there is any
excellence, if there is anything worthy of praise, think about these things.”224
There are certain truths the author discovered in his research that should be encouraging
to the foreign missionary in St. Petersburg. One truth that should encourage the foreign
missionary is that the Russian Orthodox confession is decreasing among younger generations.
The smaller percentage of Russian Orthodox identification among younger generations provides
a better chance for the missionary to help them see the need for a relationship with Christ over
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224. Phil. 4:8.
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just a religious identification. Another encouraging truth is that despite the increasing number of
atheists and agnostics among the younger generations in St. Petersburg, there is an openness
toward discussion about the Bible and changing spiritual beliefs when compared to that of Soviet
Russians. A third truth for the foreign missionary to ponder is that post-Soviet Russians have a
hope for the future. The missionary should use this positive truth to his advantage and direct their
hope to Christ.
It may be tempting to read this work and blame the missionaries of the early 1990s for
their lack of infusing worldview into ministry methods, or it may be tempting to think that the
author has unfairly attacked several missionary methods in St. Petersburg. The author’s intent,
however, and the purpose of the paper is not to attack anything that has been done or is currently
being done to minister in St. Petersburg. Instead, the purpose is to analyze this problem of very
few missionaries having seen fruit from their labors in Russia since the early 1990s so that the
missionary can have an understanding and practical working knowledge of the worldviews of
Soviet Russians versus post-Soviet Russians. It is the author’s hope that this analysis will
provide the missionary with necessary information on how to build relationships with postSoviet Russians and Soviet Russians, reach them for Christ, and involve them in their church
planting effort.
Several specific recommendations were provided throughout this thesis to help foreign
missionaries to accomplish this. In order to reach Soviet Russians, who have a hopeless element
in their worldview, the foreign missionary should: (1) give aid without expecting anything in
return, (2) teach them from the Bible about integrity, as opposed to corruption, and (3) actually
live with integrity. For instance, it would not be wise to download movies, music, books, or
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software without paying, even though it this very common in Russia. The missionary could
instead use his resistance to stealing in this manner as an example of living with integrity.
In order to reach Soviet Russians, who have a resistance to trust in their worldview, the foreign
missionary should: (1) take time to learn the history and traditions of the Soviet Russian and (2)
learn to work with existing Christian churches. This effort shows Soviet Russians that the
missionary is concerned about them as a person and not just a subject for conversion. He should
also, (3) serve whole families and not just individuals, (4) not bribe, even when culturally
accepted, and (5) live modestly. In order to reach Soviet Russians, who have a submissive
element to their worldview, the foreign missionary should put himself as a teacher on the same
level as those that he is teaching and be submissive to the government by following the laws,
even the recent one restricting missionary activity. In order to reach Soviet Russians, who have a
prejudice element to their worldview, the missionary should: (1) reach out to people of all
nationalities, (2) not domineer over those he is ministering to, (3) teach that all are one despite
race, social class, gender, and nationality, and (4) practice treating all equally in his life so that
the Soviet Russians can see his teaching in action. In order to reach Soviet Russians, who have a
Russian Orthodox element to their worldview, the foreign missionary should: (1) not focus on a
denominational label but rather what the Bible teaches, (2) encourage them to read and study the
Bible for themselves, (3) come in contact with and attempt to work with the Russian Orthodox
Church, (4) educate himself about the Russian Orthodox Church, (5) not debate the Russian
Orthodox Church publicly or privately, and (6) respect the Russian Orthodox Church.
In order to reach post-Soviet Russians, who have a rebellious element in their worldview,
the foreign missionary should stay out of the public media spotlight, especially involving any
sort of discrepancy from Russian Orthodoxy and not try to force conversions, but, instead, give
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them time to come to Christ. In order to reach post-Soviet Russians, who have an openness
element in their worldview, the foreign missionary should have an open Bible discussion and
Bible study with them and invite them privately to church services. In order to reach post-Soviet
Russians, who have a hopeful element in their worldview, the missionary should: (1) explain that
Christians put their hope in Christ who is perfect and not in man who is imperfect, (2) challenge
them to test the Bible and research it with all of their available resources, (3) teach that true
success comes from the Lord, and (4) openly be content despite not having all the luxuries of
life. The post-Soviet Russians need to see this.
The reader should also take away the truth that the author’s research has provided a birth
year, 1980, that provides a transitional point from a Soviet Russian to a post-Soviet Russian. This
practical bit of information can be useful for foreign missionaries in St. Petersburg in
determining what ministry methods to use with whom. Although it is possible to meet Russians
who were born before or after 1980 that do not fit the grouping of Soviet and post-Soviet
Russians as defined in this thesis, in general one can reasonably use this transitional point in
grouping Russians he is trying to reach.
Even though much research went into this thesis and foreign missionaries can learn from
it, it is important to realize that the research should continue because Russia and Russians are
continuing to change. Trends, such as the increasing trend of atheism and agnosticism, were
mentioned. These trends could continue, or they could not. Instead of just using specific graphs
to base future ministry efforts on, the foreign missionary should remember that a worldview shift
needs to take place when one truly repents and puts their faith in Christ. In order to assist in this
worldview shift, the missionary should make an effort to constantly understand the worldview of
the generation of Russians in St. Petersburg that he is trying to reach. When this is happening,
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true conversions are more likely to increase while false conversions are more likely to decrease.
The chances of another illusion of a spiritual harvest will decrease. It is the author’s conviction
and a final vital truth to remember that worldview needs to be constantly studied and
implemented into the ministry efforts of all missionaries not only in St. Petersburg, but also the
rest of Russia and the rest of the world. The author concurs with Golovin in his conclusion that
the restoration of worldview as a “missing dimension of evangelism is a strategic need of the
church in…the post-communist world.”225

225. Golovin, 63-4.
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APPENDIX
The large data set that was compiled from the questionnaires and used to create the
figures in this thesis was saved in an Excel file in Dropbox at
https://www.dropbox.com/s/3mx6zp6iq86068j/Appendix%20%20Thesis%20Questionnaire%20Data%20Set.xlsx?dl=0. Each question of the Russian
questionnaire contains its own column in the file. The data set is too large to include within the
contents of this thesis.

